2008年12月
December 2008
几个月前,我读到《纽约时报》上一篇关于韩国补习班的文章,里面写道:
A few months ago I read a New York Times article on South Korean cram schools that said
能否考入理想的大学,决定了一个有抱负的韩国年轻人的成败。
Admission to the right university can make or break an ambitious young South Korean.
一位家长补充说:
A parent added:
“在我们的国家,高考决定了一个人 70% 到 80% 的未来。”
"In our country, college entrance exams determine 70 to 80 percent of a person's future."
这话听起来如此陈旧过时,着实令人震惊。然而,当我还在读高中时,用这话来形容美国似乎也相差无几。这意味着,美国的情况一定已经发生了变化。
It was striking how old fashioned this sounded. And yet when I was in high school it wouldn't have seemed too far off as a description of the US. Which means things must have been changing here.
与 25 年前相比,如今美国人的命运似乎较少取决于学历凭证,而更多取决于实际表现。你上什么大学依然重要,但已经远不如从前那般举足轻重了。
The course of people's lives in the US now seems to be determined less by credentials and more by performance than it was 25 years ago. Where you go to college still matters, but not like it used to.
这期间发生了什么?
What happened?
在当时,根据学术凭证来评价人是一种进步。这种做法似乎起源于中国,从公元 587 年起,帝国文官的候选人必须参加古典文学考试。[1] 这在当时也是一种财富的考验,因为考试所要求的知识过于专业,通过考试需要多年昂贵的培训。不过,虽然财富是通过考试的必要条件,但并非充分条件。按照公元 587 年世界其他地方的标准,中国的科举制度是非常开明的。欧洲人直到 19 世纪才引入正式的文官考试,即便在那时,他们似乎也受到了中国模式的影响。
Judging people by their academic credentials was in its time an advance. The practice seems to have begun in China, where starting in 587 candidates for the imperial civil service had to take an exam on classical literature. [1] It was also a test of wealth, because the knowledge it tested was so specialized that passing required years of expensive training. But though wealth was a necessary condition for passing, it was not a sufficient one. By the standards of the rest of the world in 587, the Chinese system was very enlightened. Europeans didn't introduce formal civil service exams till the nineteenth century, and even then they seem to have been influenced by the Chinese example.
在凭证制度出现之前,政府职位主要通过家族影响力获得,甚至直接通过贿赂。根据人在考试中的表现来评价他们是一个巨大的进步,但这绝非完美的解决方案。当你用这种方式评价人时,往往会催生补习班——明代的中国和 19 世纪的英国就是如此,正如今天的韩国一样。
Before credentials, government positions were obtained mainly by family influence, if not outright bribery. It was a great step forward to judge people by their performance on a test. But by no means a perfect solution. When you judge people that way, you tend to get cram schools — which they did in Ming China and nineteenth century England just as much as in present day South Korea.
补习班本质上是密封圈上的漏洞。使用凭证制度是为了阻断权力在两代人之间的直接传递,而补习班则代表着这种力量在密封圈上找到了漏洞。补习班将上一代的财富转化为了下一代的凭证。
What cram schools are, in effect, is leaks in a seal. The use of credentials was an attempt to seal off the direct transmission of power between generations, and cram schools represent that power finding holes in the seal. Cram schools turn wealth in one generation into credentials in the next.
这种现象很难根除,因为补习学校会根据考试衡量的内容进行自我调整。当考试内容狭隘且可预测时,就会出现经典模式的补习班,比如那些为桑赫斯特(英国的西点军校)输送考生的学校,或者美国学生现在为了提高 SAT 成绩而上的辅导班。但随着考试内容变得更宽泛,补习学校也随之变得更宽泛。培养一名中国科举考生需要数年时间,就像今天的私立预科学校一样。但所有这些机构存在的根本目的(raison d'etre)都是一样的:钻系统的空子。[2]
It's hard to beat this phenomenon, because the schools adjust to suit whatever the tests measure. When the tests are narrow and predictable, you get cram schools on the classic model, like those that prepared candidates for Sandhurst (the British West Point) or the classes American students take now to improve their SAT scores. But as the tests get broader, the schools do too. Preparing a candidate for the Chinese imperial civil service exams took years, as prep school does today. But the raison d'etre of all these institutions has been the same: to beat the system. [2]
历史表明,在其他条件相同的情况下,一个社会的繁荣程度与其阻止父母直接影响子女成功的能力成正比。父母间接地帮助孩子是一件好事——例如,帮助他们变得更聪明或更有自律性,从而让他们更成功。问题出在父母使用直接手段时:当他们能够用自己的财富或权力来替代子女自身的品质时。
History suggests that, all other things being equal, a society prospers in proportion to its ability to prevent parents from influencing their children's success directly. It's a fine thing for parents to help their children indirectly — for example, by helping them to become smarter or more disciplined, which then makes them more successful. The problem comes when parents use direct methods: when they are able to use their own wealth or power as a substitute for their children's qualities.
只要有机会,父母往往就会这么做。父母可以为了孩子牺牲生命,因此,发现他们为了孩子将自己的道德底线推向极限也就不足为奇了。尤其是当其他父母也在这么做的时候。
Parents will tend to do this when they can. Parents will die for their kids, so it's not surprising to find they'll also push their scruples to the limits for them. Especially if other parents are doing it.
阻断这种力量有着双重好处。这不仅能让社会实现“贤能居其位”,还能将父母的野心从直接手段转向间接手段——即真正努力把孩子教育好。
Sealing off this force has a double advantage. Not only does a society get "the best man for the job," but parents' ambitions are diverted from direct methods to indirect ones — to actually trying to raise their kids well.
但我们应该预料到,要遏制父母为孩子谋取不公平优势的努力是非常困难的。我们面对的是人类天性中最强大的力量之一。我们不应该指望幼稚的解决方案能奏效,就像我们不指望用幼稚的办法能把海洛因挡在监狱之外一样。
But we should expect it to be very hard to contain parents' efforts to obtain an unfair advantage for their kids. We're dealing with one of the most powerful forces in human nature. We shouldn't expect naive solutions to work, any more than we'd expect naive solutions for keeping heroin out of a prison to work.
解决这个问题的显而易见的方法是让凭证制度变得更好。如果一个社会目前使用的考试容易被破解,我们可以研究人们是如何钻空子的,并努力堵住这些漏洞。你可以通过补习班来发现大部分漏洞在哪里。它们也会告诉你什么时候你成功修复了漏洞:那就是当补习班变得不再那么受欢迎的时候。
The obvious way to solve the problem is to make credentials better. If the tests a society uses are currently hackable, we can study the way people beat them and try to plug the holes. You can use the cram schools to show you where most of the holes are. They also tell you when you're succeeding in fixing them: when cram schools become less popular.
一个更普遍的解决方案是推动提高透明度,尤其是在大学录取等关键的社会瓶颈环节。在美国,这一过程仍然表现出许多显而易见的腐败迹象。例如,校友子女优先录取(legacy admissions)。官方的说法是,校友子女身份并没有多大分量,因为它只是用来打破平局:申请人按能力被归入不同的档次,而校友子女身份仅用于在跨越录取线的那个档次中进行抉择。但这意味着,大学可以通过调整跨越录取线的那个档次的大小,来让校友子女身份拥有他们想要的任意多或任意少的分量。
A more general solution would be to push for increased transparency, especially at critical social bottlenecks like college admissions. In the US this process still shows many outward signs of corruption. For example, legacy admissions. The official story is that legacy status doesn't carry much weight, because all it does is break ties: applicants are bucketed by ability, and legacy status is only used to decide between the applicants in the bucket that straddles the cutoff. But what this means is that a university can make legacy status have as much or as little weight as they want, by adjusting the size of the bucket that straddles the cutoff.
通过逐步削弱对凭证的滥用,你或许可以使其变得更加严密。但这是一场多么漫长的战斗。尤其是当管理考试的机构本身并不真正希望它们天衣无缝时。
By gradually chipping away at the abuse of credentials, you could probably make them more airtight. But what a long fight it would be. Especially when the institutions administering the tests don't really want them to be airtight.
幸运的是,有一种更好的方法可以阻止权力在代际之间的直接传递。与其试图让凭证变得更难破解,我们也可以让凭证变得不再那么重要。
Fortunately there's a better way to prevent the direct transmission of power between generations. Instead of trying to make credentials harder to hack, we can also make them matter less.
让我们思考一下凭证是用来做什么的。从功能上讲,它们是一种预测表现的方法。如果你能直接衡量实际表现,你就不需要凭证了。
Let's think about what credentials are for. What they are, functionally, is a way of predicting performance. If you could measure actual performance, you wouldn't need them.
那么,它们为什么会存在呢?为什么我们一直以来不直接衡量实际表现呢?想想凭证主义最初是在哪里出现的:在为大型组织选拔候选人的时候。在大型组织中,个人表现很难衡量,而表现越难衡量,预测表现就越重要。如果一个组织能够立即且廉价地衡量新员工的表现,他们就不需要审查他们的凭证。他们可以录用每个人,只留下优秀的人。
So why did they even evolve? Why haven't we just been measuring actual performance? Think about where credentialism first appeared: in selecting candidates for large organizations. Individual performance is hard to measure in large organizations, and the harder performance is to measure, the more important it is to predict it. If an organization could immediately and cheaply measure the performance of recruits, they wouldn't need to examine their credentials. They could take everyone and keep just the good ones.
大型组织做不到这一点。但市场中的一群小型组织却可以接近这个目标。市场会接纳每一个组织,只留下优秀的组织。随着组织变得越来越小,这就像是接纳每一个人,只留下优秀的人。因此,在其他条件相同的情况下,一个由更多、更小组织构成的社会,对凭证的关注会更少。
Large organizations can't do this. But a bunch of small organizations in a market can come close. A market takes every organization and keeps just the good ones. As organizations get smaller, this approaches taking every person and keeping just the good ones. So all other things being equal, a society consisting of more, smaller organizations will care less about credentials.
这就是美国一直在发生的变化。这就是为什么韩国的那些话听起来如此过时。他们描述的是几十年前像美国那样的经济体,由少数几家大公司主导。在那种环境下,有抱负的人的晋升路径是加入其中一家并爬到顶端。那时凭证非常重要。在大型组织的文化中,精英出身成了一种自我实现的预言。
That's what's been happening in the US. That's why those quotes from Korea sound so old fashioned. They're talking about an economy like America's a few decades ago, dominated by a few big companies. The route for the ambitious in that sort of environment is to join one and climb to the top. Credentials matter a lot then. In the culture of a large organization, an elite pedigree becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
这在小公司里行不通。即使你的同事对你的凭证印象深刻,如果你的表现不匹配,你很快就会与他们分道扬镳,因为公司会倒闭,人员会散伙。
This doesn't work in small companies. Even if your colleagues were impressed by your credentials, they'd soon be parted from you if your performance didn't match, because the company would go out of business and the people would be dispersed.
在一个由小公司组成的世界里,大家唯一关心的就是表现。为创业公司招聘的人根本不在乎你是否大学毕业,更不用说你是哪所大学毕业的了。他们唯一在乎的是你能做什么。事实上,即便在大型组织中,这也应该是唯一重要的事情。凭证之所以享有如此高的声望,是因为长期以来,一个社会中的大型组织往往是最强大的。但至少在美国,它们已经不再像以前那样垄断权力了,恰恰是因为它们无法衡量(从而无法奖励)个人表现。既然你可以直接获得市场的回报,为什么还要花 20 年的时间去爬企业晋升的梯子呢?
In a world of small companies, performance is all anyone cares about. People hiring for a startup don't care whether you've even graduated from college, let alone which one. All they care about is what you can do. Which is in fact all that should matter, even in a large organization. The reason credentials have such prestige is that for so long the large organizations in a society tended to be the most powerful. But in the US at least they don't have the monopoly on power they once did, precisely because they can't measure (and thus reward) individual performance. Why spend twenty years climbing the corporate ladder when you can get rewarded directly by the market?
我意识到,我所看到的这种变化比大多数人看到的更为夸张。作为一家早期风险投资机构的合伙人,我就像一个跳伞教官,把人们从旧的凭证世界推向新的表现世界。我是我所见证的变化的推动者。但我并不认为这是我的幻觉。25 年前,一个有抱负的人选择直接由市场来评判并非易事。你必须通过老板这一关,而他们会受到你毕业学校的影响。
I realize I see a more exaggerated version of the change than most other people. As a partner at an early stage venture funding firm, I'm like a jumpmaster shoving people out of the old world of credentials and into the new one of performance. I'm an agent of the change I'm seeing. But I don't think I'm imagining it. It was not so easy 25 years ago for an ambitious person to choose to be judged directly by the market. You had to go through bosses, and they were influenced by where you'd been to college.
是什么让小型组织在美国取得成功?我仍然不完全确定。创业公司无疑是其中很大的一部分原因。小型组织能够比大型组织更快地开发出新想法,而新想法正变得越来越有价值。
What made it possible for small organizations to succeed in America? I'm still not entirely sure. Startups are certainly a large part of it. Small organizations can develop new ideas faster than large ones, and new ideas are increasingly valuable.
但我认为,从凭证到衡量表现的转变,并不能完全归功于创业公司。我的朋友朱利安·韦伯(Julian Weber)告诉我,当他在 20 世纪 50 年代去纽约一家律师事务所工作时,他们付给初级律师的薪水远低于今天的事务所。当时的律师事务所根本不屑于根据员工的工作价值来支付薪酬。薪酬是基于资历的。年轻的员工在“熬年头”,他们以后会得到回报。
But I don't think startups account for all the shift from credentials to measurement. My friend Julian Weber told me that when he went to work for a New York law firm in the 1950s they paid associates far less than firms do today. Law firms then made no pretense of paying people according to the value of the work they'd done. Pay was based on seniority. The younger employees were paying their dues. They'd be rewarded later.
同样的原则也盛行于工业企业。当我的父亲在 20 世纪 70 年代在西屋电气(Westinghouse)工作时,他手下有些人的收入比他还要高,仅仅因为他们在那里工作的时间更长。
The same principle prevailed at industrial companies. When my father was working at Westinghouse in the 1970s, he had people working for him who made more than he did, because they'd been there longer.
现在,公司越来越需要为员工的工作支付市场价。原因之一是员工不再信任公司会兑现延迟回报:既然一家公司可能会破产,或者被收购并抹去其所有隐性义务,为什么还要努力在其中积累延迟回报呢?另一个原因是,一些公司打破了常规,开始向年轻员工支付高额薪水。这在咨询、法律和金融行业尤为突出,并在那里引发了“雅皮士(yuppies)”现象。这个词今天很少使用了,因为看到一个 25 岁的人有钱已经不再令人惊讶,但在 1985 年,看到一个 25 岁的专业人士能买得起一辆全新的宝马是如此新奇,以至于催生了一个新词。
Now companies increasingly have to pay employees market price for the work they do. One reason is that employees no longer trust companies to deliver deferred rewards: why work to accumulate deferred rewards at a company that might go bankrupt, or be taken over and have all its implicit obligations wiped out? The other is that some companies broke ranks and started to pay young employees large amounts. This was particularly true in consulting, law, and finance, where it led to the phenomenon of yuppies. The word is rarely used today because it's no longer surprising to see a 25 year old with money, but in 1985 the sight of a 25 year old professional able to afford a new BMW was so novel that it called forth a new word.
典型的雅皮士在小型组织工作。他不在 General Widget 这样的传统制造大厂工作,而是在负责 General Widget 收购业务的律师事务所,或者负责承销其债券发行的投资银行工作。
The classic yuppie worked for a small organization. He didn't work for General Widget, but for the law firm that handled General Widget's acquisitions or the investment bank that floated their bond issues.
“创业公司”和“雅皮士”大约在 20 世纪 70 年代末和 80 年代初同时进入了美国的观念词汇。我不认为这两者之间存在因果关系。创业公司的出现是因为技术开始如此迅速地变化,以至于大公司再也无法压制小公司。我不认为雅皮士的崛起是受其启发;这似乎更像是管理大公司运作方式的社会惯例(或许还有法律)发生了变化。但这两大现象迅速融合,产生了一个现在看来显而易见的原则:向精力充沛的年轻人支付市场价,并从中获得相应的高水平表现。
Startups and yuppies entered the American conceptual vocabulary roughly simultaneously in the late 1970s and early 1980s. I don't think there was a causal connection. Startups happened because technology started to change so fast that big companies could no longer keep a lid on the smaller ones. I don't think the rise of yuppies was inspired by it; it seems more as if there was a change in the social conventions (and perhaps the laws) governing the way big companies worked. But the two phenomena rapidly fused to produce a principle that now seems obvious: paying energetic young people market rates, and getting correspondingly high performance from them.
大约在同一时间,美国经济迅速走出了困扰其 20 世纪 70 年代大部分时间的低迷状态。这两者之间有联系吗?我了解得不够,无法妄下结论,但当时的感觉确实如此。释放出了巨大的能量。
At about the same time the US economy rocketed out of the doldrums that had afflicted it for most of the 1970s. Was there a connection? I don't know enough to say, but it felt like it at the time. There was a lot of energy released.
担忧自身竞争力的国家关注其境内创办的创业公司数量是正确的。但他们最好能更进一步,审视其背后的底层原则。他们是否允许精力充沛的年轻人因其所做的工作而获得市场价的报酬?年轻人就是试金石,因为当人们不根据表现获得回报时,他们无一例外地会转而根据资历获得回报。
Countries worried about their competitiveness are right to be concerned about the number of startups started within them. But they would do even better to examine the underlying principle. Do they let energetic young people get paid market rate for the work they do? The young are the test, because when people aren't rewarded according to performance, they're invariably rewarded according to seniority instead.
你只需要在经济中建立几个按表现付费的桥头堡。衡量就像热量一样蔓延。如果一个社会的某个部分比其他部分更擅长衡量,它往往会推动其他部分做得更好。如果聪明且有干劲的年轻人通过创办自己的公司,能比为现有公司工作赚得更多,那么现有的公司就会被迫支付更高的薪水来留住他们。因此,市场化薪酬会逐渐渗透到每一个组织,甚至是政府。[3]
All it takes is a few beachheads in your economy that pay for performance. Measurement spreads like heat. If one part of a society is better at measurement than others, it tends to push the others to do better. If people who are young but smart and driven can make more by starting their own companies than by working for existing ones, the existing companies are forced to pay more to keep them. So market rates gradually permeate every organization, even the government. [3]
对表现的衡量甚至会迫使颁发凭证的组织步入正轨。当我们还是孩子的时候,我经常命令我妹妹去做一些我知道她本来就要做的事情,以此来惹恼她。随着凭证被表现所取代,前守门人所能指望的最好角色也不过如此。一旦授予凭证的机构不再从事“自我实现预言”的行当,他们就必须付出更多努力来预测未来。
The measurement of performance will tend to push even the organizations issuing credentials into line. When we were kids I used to annoy my sister by ordering her to do things I knew she was about to do anyway. As credentials are superseded by performance, a similar role is the best former gatekeepers can hope for. Once credential granting institutions are no longer in the self-fulfilling prophecy business, they'll have to work harder to predict the future.
凭证比贿赂和影响力更进了一步。但它们不是终点。还有一种更好的方法来阻断权力在代际之间的传递:鼓励经济向由更多、更小单元组成的趋势发展。这样你就可以直接衡量那些凭证仅仅只能预测的东西。
Credentials are a step beyond bribery and influence. But they're not the final step. There's an even better way to block the transmission of power between generations: to encourage the trend toward an economy made of more, smaller units. Then you can measure what credentials merely predict.
没有人喜欢权力在代际之间传递——无论是左翼还是右翼。但事实证明,右翼所青睐的市场力量,比左翼不得不求助的凭证制度,能更有效地阻止这种传递。
No one likes the transmission of power between generations — not the left or the right. But the market forces favored by the right turn out to be a better way of preventing it than the credentials the left are forced to fall back on.
当大型组织的力量在 20 世纪末达到顶峰时,凭证时代便开始走向终结。现在,我们似乎正在进入一个以衡量为基础的新时代。这种新模式之所以推进得如此迅速,是因为它的效果要好得多。并且,它目前没有显露出任何放缓的迹象。
The era of credentials began to end when the power of large organizations peaked in the late twentieth century. Now we seem to be entering a new era based on measurement. The reason the new model has advanced so rapidly is that it works so much better. It shows no sign of slowing.
注释
Notes
[1] 宫崎市定(Miyazaki, Ichisada)著(Conrad Schirokauer 译),《中国的科举地狱:帝国中国的文官考试》(China's Examination Hell: The Civil Service Examinations of Imperial China),耶鲁大学出版社,1981年。
[1] Miyazaki, Ichisada (Conrad Schirokauer trans.), China's Examination Hell: The Civil Service Examinations of Imperial China, Yale University Press, 1981.
古埃及的抄写员也参加考试,但那更像是任何学徒都必须通过的技能熟练度测试。
Scribes in ancient Egypt took exams, but they were more the type of proficiency test any apprentice might have to pass.
[2] 当我说预科学校存在的根本目的是为了让孩子进入更好的大学时,我是从最狭义的意义上说的。我不是说这是预科学校所做的全部,只是说如果它们对大学录取完全没有影响,人们对它们的需求就会少得多。
[2] When I say the raison d'etre of prep schools is to get kids into better colleges, I mean this in the narrowest sense. I'm not saying that's all prep schools do, just that if they had zero effect on college admissions there would be far less demand for them.
[3] 然而,累进税率往往会削弱这种效应,因为它缩小了善于衡量者与不善衡量者之间的差距。
[3] Progressive tax rates will tend to damp this effect, however, by decreasing the difference between good and bad measurers.
感谢 Trevor Blackwell、Sarah Harlin、Jessica Livingston 和 David Sloo 阅读本文草稿。
Thanks to Trevor Blackwell, Sarah Harlin, Jessica Livingston, and David Sloo for reading drafts of this.