几天前,我突然意识到微软已经死了。当时我正和一位年轻的创业公司创始人聊天,谈到谷歌与雅虎有什么不同。我说,雅虎从一开始就因为害怕微软而扭曲了自己,这就是为什么他们把自己定位为一家“媒体公司”而不是技术公司。接着我看着他的脸,发现他根本没听懂。那感觉就像我当年告诉他,80年代中期女孩子有多喜欢巴里·曼尼洛(Barry Manilow)一样。巴里是谁?

A few days ago I suddenly realized Microsoft was dead. I was talking to a young startup founder about how Google was different from Yahoo. I said that Yahoo had been warped from the start by their fear of Microsoft. That was why they'd positioned themselves as a "media company" instead of a technology company. Then I looked at his face and realized he didn't understand. It was as if I'd told him how much girls liked Barry Manilow in the mid 80s. Barry who?

微软?他什么也没说,但我看得出来,他压根不相信有人会害怕微软。

Microsoft? He didn't say anything, but I could tell he didn't quite believe anyone would be frightened of them.

从80年代末开始,微软阴影笼罩了软件界近20年。我还记得在他们之前,笼罩一切的是IBM。我当时基本上无视了这层阴影。我从不用微软的软件,所以它只是间接影响到我——比如僵尸网络发给我的垃圾邮件。正因为我没怎么关注,所以当这层阴影消逝时,我甚至没有察觉。

Microsoft cast a shadow over the software world for almost 20 years starting in the late 80s. I can remember when it was IBM before them. I mostly ignored this shadow. I never used Microsoft software, so it only affected me indirectly—for example, in the spam I got from botnets. And because I wasn't paying attention, I didn't notice when the shadow disappeared.

但现在它确实消失了。我能感觉得到。现在甚至连一个害怕微软的人都没有了。他们依然赚得盆满钵满——在这点上,IBM也一样。但他们不再具有威胁性了。

But it's gone now. I can sense that. No one is even afraid of Microsoft anymore. They still make a lot of money—so does IBM, for that matter. But they're not dangerous.

微软是在什么时候死去的,又死于什么?我知道在2001年时他们看起来还挺危险,因为我当时写过一篇文章,分析他们其实没有看起来那么可怕。我猜他们在2005年就已经死了。我知道,当我们创办 Y Combinator 时,我们从未担心过微软会成为我们资助的创业公司的对手。事实上,我们甚至从未邀请过他们来参加我们的路演日(Demo Day,即创业公司向投资人展示项目的活动)。我们邀请了雅虎、谷歌以及其他一些互联网公司,但从未费心去邀请微软。而微软那边也从来没有人给我们发过哪怕一封电子邮件。他们生活在另一个世界里。

When did Microsoft die, and of what? I know they seemed dangerous as late as 2001, because I wrote an essay then about how they were less dangerous than they seemed. I'd guess they were dead by 2005. I know when we started Y Combinator we didn't worry about Microsoft as competition for the startups we funded. In fact, we've never even invited them to the demo days we organize for startups to present to investors. We invite Yahoo and Google and some other Internet companies, but we've never bothered to invite Microsoft. Nor has anyone there ever even sent us an email. They're in a different world.

是什么杀死了他们?我认为有四点,它们都在2000年代中期同时发生。

What killed them? Four things, I think, all of them occurring simultaneously in the mid 2000s.

最显而易见的是谷歌。一山不容二虎,而谷歌显然成了新的霸主。无论是从正面还是负面意义上来说,谷歌现在都是迄今为止最危险的公司。微软充其量只能在后面步履蹒跚地跟风。

The most obvious is Google. There can only be one big man in town, and they're clearly it. Google is the most dangerous company now by far, in both the good and bad senses of the word. Microsoft can at best limp along afterward.

谷歌是在什么时候确立领先地位的?人们倾向于追溯到2004年8月他们上市的时候,但那时他们还没有主导话语权。我认为他们是在2005年确立领先的。Gmail 是推波助澜的关键力量之一。Gmail 证明了谷歌能做的远不止搜索。

When did Google take the lead? There will be a tendency to push it back to their IPO in August 2004, but they weren't setting the terms of the debate then. I'd say they took the lead in 2005. Gmail was one of the things that put them over the edge. Gmail showed they could do more than search.

Gmail 还展示了如果你利用后来被称为“Ajax”的技术,基于 Web 的软件能有多强大。这就是微软死掉的第二个原因:人人都能看出桌面时代结束了。应用软件走向 Web 化如今看来已是不可逆转的趋势——不仅是电子邮件,所有的东西,甚至连 Photoshop 都会搬上网页。现在连微软自己也看清了这一点。

Gmail also showed how much you could do with web-based software, if you took advantage of what later came to be called "Ajax." And that was the second cause of Microsoft's death: everyone can see the desktop is over. It now seems inevitable that applications will live on the web—not just email, but everything, right up to Photoshop. Even Microsoft sees that now.

讽刺的是,微软无意中助推了 Ajax 的诞生。Ajax 中的“x”代表 XMLHttpRequest 对象,它能让浏览器在显示页面的同时,在后台与服务器进行通信。(起初,与服务器通信的唯一方式是请求一个新页面。)XMLHttpRequest 是微软在90年代末为了 Outlook 的需求而开发出来的。他们当时没有意识到的是,这个东西对其他很多人也大有用处——实际上,适用于任何想让 Web 应用像桌面应用一样流畅运行的人。

Ironically, Microsoft unintentionally helped create Ajax. The x in Ajax is from the XMLHttpRequest object, which lets the browser communicate with the server in the background while displaying a page. (Originally the only way to communicate with the server was to ask for a new page.) XMLHttpRequest was created by Microsoft in the late 90s because they needed it for Outlook. What they didn't realize was that it would be useful to a lot of other people too—in fact, to anyone who wanted to make web apps work like desktop ones.

Ajax 的另一个关键部分是 Javascript,即在浏览器中运行的编程语言。微软看出了 Javascript 的威胁,并试图尽可能长久地让它保持残缺不全的状态。[1] 但最终开源世界赢了,他们开发出了各种 Javascript 库,绕过了 Explorer 浏览器的种种缺陷,就像树木绕着铁丝网生长一样,生生把路给趟通了。

The other critical component of Ajax is Javascript, the programming language that runs in the browser. Microsoft saw the danger of Javascript and tried to keep it broken for as long as they could. [1] But eventually the open source world won, by producing Javascript libraries that grew over the brokenness of Explorer the way a tree grows over barbed wire.

微软死掉的第三个原因是宽带互联网。现在,任何在乎网速的人都能用上高速宽带。而通往服务器的管道越宽,你对桌面端的依赖就越少。

The third cause of Microsoft's death was broadband Internet. Anyone who cares can have fast Internet access now. And the bigger the pipe to the server, the less you need the desktop.

棺材上的最后一根钉子,居然来自苹果。得益于 OS X,苹果从死亡边缘奇迹般地复活了,这在科技史上极其罕见。[2] 他们的胜利是如此彻底,以至于我现在看到运行 Windows 的电脑都会感到惊讶。我们在 Y Combinator 资助的创始人中,几乎所有人都在用苹果笔记本。在 Startup School 的观众席上也是如此。现在的计算机从业者要么用 Mac,要么用 Linux。Windows 成了老奶奶专用的系统,就像90年代的 Mac 一样。所以,不仅桌面端不再重要,而且任何在乎电脑的人,根本都不用微软的产品了。

The last nail in the coffin came, of all places, from Apple. Thanks to OS X, Apple has come back from the dead in a way that is extremely rare in technology. [2] Their victory is so complete that I'm now surprised when I come across a computer running Windows. Nearly all the people we fund at Y Combinator use Apple laptops. It was the same in the audience at startup school. All the computer people use Macs or Linux now. Windows is for grandmas, like Macs used to be in the 90s. So not only does the desktop no longer matter, no one who cares about computers uses Microsoft's anyway.

当然,苹果在音乐领域也把微软打得落荒而逃,而且电视和手机也已经在路上了。

And of course Apple has Microsoft on the run in music too, with TV and phones on the way.

我很高兴微软死了。他们就像尼禄或康茂德——带着那种只有继承了权力才会滋生出来的恶。因为请记住,微软的垄断并非始于微软,他们是从 IBM 那里继承来的。从1950年代中期到2005年左右,软件行业一直笼罩在垄断的阴影下。实际上,这几乎贯穿了软件业的整个存在历史。“Web 2.0”之所以让人感到如此兴奋,其中一个原因就是大家潜意识里感觉到,这个垄断时代可能终于要结束了。

I'm glad Microsoft is dead. They were like Nero or Commodus—evil in the way only inherited power can make you. Because remember, the Microsoft monopoly didn't begin with Microsoft. They got it from IBM. The software business was overhung by a monopoly from about the mid-1950s to about 2005. For practically its whole existence, that is. One of the reasons "Web 2.0" has such an air of euphoria about it is the feeling, conscious or not, that this era of monopoly may finally be over.

当然,作为一名黑客,我忍不住会去想,坏掉的东西要怎么修。微软还有没有可能卷土重来?原则上是有的。要明白怎么做,先想象两件事:(a)微软现在手头拥有的现金数量;(b)十年前拉里和谢尔盖带着谷歌的创意,挨个拜访各大搜索引擎,想以100万美元的价格卖掉,结果被所有人拒绝。

Of course, as a hacker I can't help thinking about how something broken could be fixed. Is there some way Microsoft could come back? In principle, yes. To see how, envision two things: (a) the amount of cash Microsoft now has on hand, and (b) Larry and Sergey making the rounds of all the search engines ten years ago trying to sell the idea for Google for a million dollars, and being turned down by everyone.

令人惊讶的事实是,那些才华横溢——甚至才华到可怕地步的黑客,如果按微软这种富豪公司的标准来看,其实可以用极低的成本招致麾下。他们现在可能不到聪明人了,但他们只需多花一个数量级的钱,就能想买多少就买多少。所以,如果他们想重新成为竞争者,可以这么做:

The surprising fact is, brilliant hackers—dangerously brilliant hackers—can be had very cheaply, by the standards of a company as rich as Microsoft. They can't hire smart people anymore, but they could buy as many as they wanted for only an order of magnitude more. So if they wanted to be a contender again, this is how they could do it:

  1. 买下所有优秀的“Web 2.0”创业公司。买下这全部公司的花费,其实比他们买下 Facebook 要付的钱还少。
  2. 把他们统一安置在硅谷的一栋大楼里,四周用铅板屏蔽起来,免得他们与雷德蒙德(微软总部)产生任何接触。
  1. Buy all the good "Web 2.0" startups. They could get substantially all of them for less than they'd have to pay for Facebook.
  2. Put them all in a building in Silicon Valley, surrounded by lead shielding to protect them from any contact with Redmond.

我觉得提出这个建议很安全,因为他们绝不会这么做。微软最大的弱点在于,他们至今还没意识到自己有多差劲。他们仍然认为自己能在内部写出好软件。在桌面时代,也许他们确实可以。但那个时代在几年前就结束了。

I feel safe suggesting this, because they'd never do it. Microsoft's biggest weakness is that they still don't realize how much they suck. They still think they can write software in house. Maybe they can, by the standards of the desktop world. But that world ended a few years ago.

我已经能预料到这篇文章会引起什么反响了。一半的读者会说,微软仍然是一家利润极高的巨头,我不应该根据我们狭隘的“Web 2.0”圈子里少数人的看法就轻率得出结论。而另一半读者,也就是更年轻的那一代,则会抱怨这早就是旧闻了。

I already know what the reaction to this essay will be. Half the readers will say that Microsoft is still an enormously profitable company, and that I should be more careful about drawing conclusions based on what a few people think in our insular little "Web 2.0" bubble. The other half, the younger half, will complain that this is old news.

Notes

[1] 让软件变得不兼容并不需要刻意为之。你只需要在修复 Bug 上不那么努力就行了——如果你是一家大公司,你产生的 Bug 数量本来就极为可观。这种情况类似于“文学理论家”的写作。大多数人并非故意写得晦涩难懂,他们只是不屑于写得通俗易懂。因为那样做不划算。

[1] It doesn't take a conscious effort to make software incompatible. All you have to do is not work too hard at fixing bugs—which, if you're a big company, you produce in copious quantities. The situation is analogous to the writing of "literary theorists." Most don't try to be obscure; they just don't make an effort to be clear. It wouldn't pay.

[2] 部分原因是史蒂夫·乔布斯被约翰·斯卡利赶走的方式在科技公司中非常罕见。如果苹果董事会没有犯下那个愚蠢的错误,他们后来也就不需要经历这次起死回生了。

[2] In part because Steve Jobs got pushed out by John Sculley in a way that's rare among technology companies. If Apple's board hadn't made that blunder, they wouldn't have had to bounce back.