(本文最初发表于《黑客与画家》)

(This essay was originally published in Hackers & Painters.)

如果你想变富有,你会怎么做?我认为你最好的选择是创办或加入一家创业公司。数百年来,这一直是致富的可靠途径。“创业公司”(startup)这个词源于 20 世纪 60 年代,但其中发生的事情,与中世纪那些由风险资金支持的航海贸易非常相似。

If you wanted to get rich, how would you do it? I think your best bet would be to start or join a startup. That's been a reliable way to get rich for hundreds of years. The word "startup" dates from the 1960s, but what happens in one is very similar to the venture-backed trading voyages of the Middle Ages.

创业公司通常与技术挂钩,以至于“高科技创业公司”这个词几乎显得有些多余。创业公司就是一家解决艰难技术问题的小公司。

Startups usually involve technology, so much so that the phrase "high-tech startup" is almost redundant. A startup is a small company that takes on a hard technical problem.

许多人仅凭知道这一点就变富了。你不需要懂物理学也能成为一名优秀的投手。但我认为,理解其背后的底层原理能给你带来优势。为什么创业公司必须规模小?随着创业公司不断壮大,它是否不可避免地不再是一家创业公司?为什么它们如此频繁地致力于开发新技术?为什么会有那么多创业公司在销售新药或计算机软件,而没有一家在卖玉米油或洗衣粉?

Lots of people get rich knowing nothing more than that. You don't have to know physics to be a good pitcher. But I think it could give you an edge to understand the underlying principles. Why do startups have to be small? Will a startup inevitably stop being a startup as it grows larger? And why do they so often work on developing new technology? Why are there so many startups selling new drugs or computer software, and none selling corn oil or laundry detergent?

基本命题

The Proposition

从经济学角度来看,你可以把创业公司看作是一种将你整个职业生涯压缩到几年的方式。你不再是低强度地工作四十年,而是竭尽所能地拼命工作四年。这在技术领域回报尤为丰厚,因为快速工作能让你获得溢价。

Economically, you can think of a startup as a way to compress your whole working life into a few years. Instead of working at a low intensity for forty years, you work as hard as you possibly can for four. This pays especially well in technology, where you earn a premium for working fast.

以下是这个经济学命题的简要轮廓。如果你是一个二十五六岁、水平不错的黑客,你可以找到一份年薪大约 8 万美元的工作。因此,平均而言,这样的黑客每年必须为公司创造至少价值 8 万美元的工作量才能达到盈亏平衡。作为创业公司的员工,你的工作时间可能是普通公司员工的两倍,而且如果你足够专注,你在一小时内创造的产出可能是他们的三倍。[1] 通过消除大公司里那些愚蠢的中层管理者的阻碍,你应该能让效率再翻至少一倍。然后还有一个乘数:你比你的岗位职责所期望的要聪明多少?假设这又是三倍的乘数。把所有这些乘数相乘,我的结论是,你可能比在一家普通大公司里被期望的效率高出 36 倍。[2] 如果一个相当不错的黑客在大公司年薪值 8 万美元,那么一个聪明、极其努力、且不受任何公司官僚主义拖累的黑客,每年应该能创造价值约 300 万美元的工作。

Here is a brief sketch of the economic proposition. If you're a good hacker in your mid twenties, you can get a job paying about $80,000 per year. So on average such a hacker must be able to do at least $80,000 worth of work per year for the company just to break even. You could probably work twice as many hours as a corporate employee, and if you focus you can probably get three times as much done in an hour. [1] You should get another multiple of two, at least, by eliminating the drag of the pointy-haired middle manager who would be your boss in a big company. Then there is one more multiple: how much smarter are you than your job description expects you to be? Suppose another multiple of three. Combine all these multipliers, and I'm claiming you could be 36 times more productive than you're expected to be in a random corporate job. [2] If a fairly good hacker is worth $80,000 a year at a big company, then a smart hacker working very hard without any corporate bullshit to slow him down should be able to do work worth about $3 million a year.

像所有粗略的估算一样,这个计算有很大的弹性空间。我不会去死守这些具体数字。但我坚持这种计算结构。我并不是说这个乘数精确地是 36,但它肯定大于 10,而且极少会高达 100。

Like all back-of-the-envelope calculations, this one has a lot of wiggle room. I wouldn't try to defend the actual numbers. But I stand by the structure of the calculation. I'm not claiming the multiplier is precisely 36, but it is certainly more than 10, and probably rarely as high as 100.

如果每年 300 万美元听起来很高,请记住我们讨论的是极限情况:在这种情况下,你不仅没有任何闲暇时间,而且工作极其拼命,甚至危害到了身体健康。

If $3 million a year seems high, remember that we're talking about the limit case: the case where you not only have zero leisure time but indeed work so hard that you endanger your health.

创业公司并非魔法。它们没有改变财富创造的法则。它们只是代表了曲线极值上的一点。这里存在一个守恒定律:如果你想赚到 100 万美元,你就必须承受价值 100 万美元的痛苦。例如,赚取 100 万美元的一种方法是在邮局工作一辈子,并存下每一分钱。想象一下在邮局工作五十年的压力吧。而在创业公司,你把所有这些压力压缩到了三四年里。如果你批量购买这种“经济装”的痛苦,确实能获得一定的折扣,但你无法逃避基本的守恒定律。如果创办一家创业公司很容易,所有人都会去做了。

Startups are not magic. They don't change the laws of wealth creation. They just represent a point at the far end of the curve. There is a conservation law at work here: if you want to make a million dollars, you have to endure a million dollars' worth of pain. For example, one way to make a million dollars would be to work for the Post Office your whole life, and save every penny of your salary. Imagine the stress of working for the Post Office for fifty years. In a startup you compress all this stress into three or four years. You do tend to get a certain bulk discount if you buy the economy-size pain, but you can't evade the fundamental conservation law. If starting a startup were easy, everyone would do it.

百万,而非十亿

Millions, not Billions

如果每年 300 万美元对某些人来说听起来很高,那么对另一些人来说则显得很低。才三百万?我怎么才能像比尔·盖茨那样成为亿万富翁?

If $3 million a year seems high to some people, it will seem low to others. Three million? How do I get to be a billionaire, like Bill Gates?

所以,我们现在先把比尔·盖茨放在一边。用著名的富豪做例子并不是个好主意,因为媒体只报道最富有的人,而这些人往往是离群值。比尔·盖茨聪明、坚韧、勤奋,但要赚到像他那么多钱,仅仅靠这些是不够的。你还需要非常幸运。

So let's get Bill Gates out of the way right now. It's not a good idea to use famous rich people as examples, because the press only write about the very richest, and these tend to be outliers. Bill Gates is a smart, determined, and hardworking man, but you need more than that to make as much money as he has. You also need to be very lucky.

任何公司的成功都存在巨大的随机因素。因此,你最终在报纸上读到的那些人,都是既非常聪明、完全专注,中了彩票的人。比尔当然聪明且专注,但微软也恰好成为了商业史上最惊人失误之一的受益者:DOS 的许可协议。毫无疑问,比尔尽了一切努力引导 IBM 犯下那个失误,并且在利用这个失误方面做得非常出色。但如果当时 IBM 方面有一个有脑子的人,微软的未来就会完全不同。当时的微软对 IBM 几乎没有谈判筹码。他们实际上只是一个零部件供应商。如果 IBM 像他们本该做的那样,要求独家许可,微软依然会签署协议。这仍然意味着能赚一大笔钱,而 IBM 本可以轻易从其他地方获取操作系统。

There is a large random factor in the success of any company. So the guys you end up reading about in the papers are the ones who are very smart, totally dedicated, and win the lottery. Certainly Bill is smart and dedicated, but Microsoft also happens to have been the beneficiary of one of the most spectacular blunders in the history of business: the licensing deal for DOS. No doubt Bill did everything he could to steer IBM into making that blunder, and he has done an excellent job of exploiting it, but if there had been one person with a brain on IBM's side, Microsoft's future would have been very different. Microsoft at that stage had little leverage over IBM. They were effectively a component supplier. If IBM had required an exclusive license, as they should have, Microsoft would still have signed the deal. It would still have meant a lot of money for them, and IBM could easily have gotten an operating system elsewhere.

然而,IBM 最终却动用了其在市场上的全部力量,将 PC 标准的控制权拱手让给了微软。从那时起,微软要做的就只有执行了。他们从未需要在一项大胆的决策上赌上整家公司。他们要做的只是对被许可方采取强硬态度,并以足够快的速度模仿更有创意的产品。

Instead IBM ended up using all its power in the market to give Microsoft control of the PC standard. From that point, all Microsoft had to do was execute. They never had to bet the company on a bold decision. All they had to do was play hardball with licensees and copy more innovative products reasonably promptly.

如果 IBM 没有犯这个错误,微软依然会是一家成功的公司,但它不可能发展得这么快、这么大。比尔·盖茨也会富有,但他可能会和同龄的其他富豪一起,排在《福布斯》400 富豪榜接近底部的位置。

If IBM hadn't made this mistake, Microsoft would still have been a successful company, but it could not have grown so big so fast. Bill Gates would be rich, but he'd be somewhere near the bottom of the Forbes 400 with the other guys his age.

致富的方法有很多,而这篇文章只探讨其中一种。这篇文章探讨的是如何通过创造财富并获得报酬来赚钱。还有很多其他获取金钱的方法,包括运气、投机、婚姻、继承、偷窃、敲诈、欺诈、垄断、贪污、游说、伪造和勘探。大多数巨额财富可能都涉及其中几种。

There are a lot of ways to get rich, and this essay is about only one of them. This essay is about how to make money by creating wealth and getting paid for it. There are plenty of other ways to get money, including chance, speculation, marriage, inheritance, theft, extortion, fraud, monopoly, graft, lobbying, counterfeiting, and prospecting. Most of the greatest fortunes have probably involved several of these.

作为致富途径,创造财富的优势不仅在于它更合法(其他许多方法现在都是违法的),而且在于它更直接。你只需要做一些人们想要的东西。

The advantage of creating wealth, as a way to get rich, is not just that it's more legitimate (many of the other methods are now illegal) but that it's more straightforward. You just have to do something people want.

金钱不等于财富

Money Is Not Wealth

如果你想创造财富,理解财富是什么会有所帮助。财富和金钱不是一回事。[3] 财富的历史与人类历史一样悠久。事实上还要久得多,蚂蚁也有财富。而金钱是一个相对近期的发明。

If you want to create wealth, it will help to understand what it is. Wealth is not the same thing as money. [3] Wealth is as old as human history. Far older, in fact; ants have wealth. Money is a comparatively recent invention.

财富是根本。财富是我们想要的东西:食物、衣服、房子、汽车、小工具、去有趣地方旅行等等。你可以拥有财富而没有金钱。如果你有一台神奇的机器,可以根据指令为你造一辆车、做一顿饭、洗衣服,或者做任何你想要的其他事情,你就不需要金钱了。而如果你身处南极洲中部,那里没有任何东西可以购买,那么你拥有多少钱都无济于事。

Wealth is the fundamental thing. Wealth is stuff we want: food, clothes, houses, cars, gadgets, travel to interesting places, and so on. You can have wealth without having money. If you had a magic machine that could on command make you a car or cook you dinner or do your laundry, or do anything else you wanted, you wouldn't need money. Whereas if you were in the middle of Antarctica, where there is nothing to buy, it wouldn't matter how much money you had.

财富才是你想要的东西,而不是金钱。但如果财富是重要的东西,为什么大家都在谈论赚钱呢?这是一种简称:金钱是转移财富的一种方式,在实践中它们通常可以互换。但它们不是一回事,除非你计划通过印假钞致富,否则谈论赚钱会让你更难理解如何创造财富。

Wealth is what you want, not money. But if wealth is the important thing, why does everyone talk about making money? It is a kind of shorthand: money is a way of moving wealth, and in practice they are usually interchangeable. But they are not the same thing, and unless you plan to get rich by counterfeiting, talking about making money can make it harder to understand how to make money.

金钱是分工的副产品。在一个高度分工的社会里,你所需的大部分东西,自己是无法制造的。如果你想要一个土豆、一支铅笔或一个住处,你必须从别人那里获得。

Money is a side effect of specialization. In a specialized society, most of the things you need, you can't make for yourself. If you want a potato or a pencil or a place to live, you have to get it from someone else.

你如何让种土豆的人分你一些?通过给他一些他想要的东西作为回报。但是,如果你直接与需要你产品的人进行物物交换,你走不了多远。如果你制作小提琴,而当地的农民都不需要,你该怎么吃饭?

How do you get the person who grows the potatoes to give you some? By giving him something he wants in return. But you can't get very far by trading things directly with the people who need them. If you make violins, and none of the local farmers wants one, how will you eat?

随着分工越来越细,社会发现的解决方案是将交易变成一个两步的过程。你不再直接用小提琴换土豆,而是用小提琴换取比如白银,然后你再用白银换取你需要的任何其他东西。这种中间媒介——交易媒介——可以是任何稀有且便于携带的东西。历史上,金属是最常见的媒介,但最近我们一直在使用一种名为美元的交易媒介,它在物理上并不存在。然而,它能作为交易媒介发挥作用,是因为它的稀缺性由美国政府担保。

The solution societies find, as they get more specialized, is to make the trade into a two-step process. Instead of trading violins directly for potatoes, you trade violins for, say, silver, which you can then trade again for anything else you need. The intermediate stuff-- the medium of exchange-- can be anything that's rare and portable. Historically metals have been the most common, but recently we've been using a medium of exchange, called the dollar, that doesn't physically exist. It works as a medium of exchange, however, because its rarity is guaranteed by the U.S. Government.

交易媒介的优势在于它让贸易运转起来。缺点在于它往往会掩盖贸易的真实含义。人们认为企业的目的就是赚钱。但金钱只是中间阶段——只是人们想要的东西的一种简称。大多数企业真正做的是创造财富。他们做一些人们想要的东西。[4]

The advantage of a medium of exchange is that it makes trade work. The disadvantage is that it tends to obscure what trade really means. People think that what a business does is make money. But money is just the intermediate stage-- just a shorthand-- for whatever people want. What most businesses really do is make wealth. They do something people want. [4]

饼图谬误

The Pie Fallacy

令人惊讶的是,许多人到了成年依然保留着童年时期的想法,即世界上的财富总量是固定的。在任何正常的家庭中,任何时刻的金钱数额都是固定的。但这并不是一回事。

A surprising number of people retain from childhood the idea that there is a fixed amount of wealth in the world. There is, in any normal family, a fixed amount of money at any moment. But that's not the same thing.

在这种背景下讨论财富时,它经常被描述为一个饼。“你无法把饼做大,”政客们说。当你谈论一个家庭银行账户里的钱,或者政府一年的税收收入时,这确实是真的。如果一个人得到了更多,另一个人就必须得到更少。

When wealth is talked about in this context, it is often described as a pie. "You can't make the pie larger," say politicians. When you're talking about the amount of money in one family's bank account, or the amount available to a government from one year's tax revenue, this is true. If one person gets more, someone else has to get less.

我还记得小时候相信,如果少数富人拥有了所有的钱,留给其他人的就少了。许多人似乎到了成年还继续相信类似的事情。当你听到有人谈论百分之多少的人口占有了百分之多少的财富时,这种谬误通常就在背景中作祟。如果你计划创办一家创业公司,那么无论你是否意识到,你都在计划证伪“饼图谬误”。

I can remember believing, as a child, that if a few rich people had all the money, it left less for everyone else. Many people seem to continue to believe something like this well into adulthood. This fallacy is usually there in the background when you hear someone talking about how x percent of the population have y percent of the wealth. If you plan to start a startup, then whether you realize it or not, you're planning to disprove the Pie Fallacy.

让人们产生误导的是金钱的抽象性。金钱不是财富。它只是我们用来转移财富的工具。因此,尽管在某些特定时刻(比如你家本月)可用于与他人交易所需物品的金钱数额是固定的,但世界上的财富总量并不是固定的。你可以创造更多的财富。 在整个人类历史上,财富一直在被创造和销毁(但总的来说,是在被创造)。

What leads people astray here is the abstraction of money. Money is not wealth. It's just something we use to move wealth around. So although there may be, in certain specific moments (like your family, this month) a fixed amount of money available to trade with other people for things you want, there is not a fixed amount of wealth in the world. You can make more wealth. Wealth has been getting created and destroyed (but on balance, created) for all of human history.

假设你拥有一辆破旧的老爷车。明年夏天,你不用闲坐着,而是可以花时间将车恢复到崭新的状态。在这个过程中,你创造了财富。这个世界——尤其是你个人——多了一辆崭新的老爷车。这不仅仅是某种比喻。如果你卖掉这辆车,你会得到更多的钱。

Suppose you own a beat-up old car. Instead of sitting on your butt next summer, you could spend the time restoring your car to pristine condition. In doing so you create wealth. The world is-- and you specifically are-- one pristine old car the richer. And not just in some metaphorical way. If you sell your car, you'll get more for it.

在修复旧车的过程中,你让自己变得更富有了。你并没有让其他任何人变得更穷。所以显然不存在一个固定的饼。事实上,当你这样看待它时,你会奇怪为什么有人会认为饼是固定的。[5]

In restoring your old car you have made yourself richer. You haven't made anyone else poorer. So there is obviously not a fixed pie. And in fact, when you look at it this way, you wonder why anyone would think there was. [5]

孩子们知道——虽然不知道自己知道——他们可以创造财富。如果你需要送别人一件礼物却没钱,你就自己动手做一个。但是孩子们做东西的水平太差了,以至于他们认为手工礼物是与商店买来的礼物截然不同、且低人一等的东西——仅仅是那种“礼轻情意重”的象征。确实,我们给父母做的那些凹凸不平的烟灰缸在二手市场上并没有什么销路。

Kids know, without knowing they know, that they can create wealth. If you need to give someone a present and don't have any money, you make one. But kids are so bad at making things that they consider home-made presents to be a distinct, inferior, sort of thing to store-bought ones-- a mere expression of the proverbial thought that counts. And indeed, the lumpy ashtrays we made for our parents did not have much of a resale market.

手艺人

Craftsmen

最容易理解财富可以被创造的人是那些擅长制造东西的人,即手艺人。他们手工制作的物品变成了商店里出售的商品。但随着工业化的兴起,手艺人越来越少。剩下最大的群体之一是计算机程序员。

The people most likely to grasp that wealth can be created are the ones who are good at making things, the craftsmen. Their hand-made objects become store-bought ones. But with the rise of industrialization there are fewer and fewer craftsmen. One of the biggest remaining groups is computer programmers.

程序员可以坐在电脑前创造财富。一个优秀的软件本身就是一件有价值的东西。这里没有制造环节来混淆视听。你输入进去的那些字符就是一个完整的、成型的产品。如果有人坐下来写一个不难用的浏览器(顺便说一句,这是个极好的主意),世界就会因此变得更富有。[5b]

A programmer can sit down in front of a computer and create wealth. A good piece of software is, in itself, a valuable thing. There is no manufacturing to confuse the issue. Those characters you type are a complete, finished product. If someone sat down and wrote a web browser that didn't suck (a fine idea, by the way), the world would be that much richer. [5b]

公司里的每个人都在共同创造财富,即制造更多人们想要的东西。许多员工(例如收发室或人事部门的人)的工作与实际制造产品隔了一层。但程序员不是。他们逐行写出产品,字面意义上是在用思想构建产品。因此,程序员更容易看清,财富是创造出来的,而不是像切蛋糕一样由某个想象中的“老爹”分配的。

Everyone in a company works together to create wealth, in the sense of making more things people want. Many of the employees (e.g. the people in the mailroom or the personnel department) work at one remove from the actual making of stuff. Not the programmers. They literally think the product, one line at a time. And so it's clearer to programmers that wealth is something that's made, rather than being distributed, like slices of a pie, by some imaginary Daddy.

对程序员来说,财富创造速度的巨大差异也是显而易见的。在 Viaweb,我们有一位程序员,简直是一个生产力怪兽。我记得在漫长的一天里看着他的工作,估算他为公司增加了几十万美元的市场价值。一个优秀的程序员,在状态极佳时,能在两周内创造出价值 100 万美元的财富。而一个平庸的程序员在同一时期产生的财富为零,甚至是负数(例如,通过引入 Bug)。

It's also obvious to programmers that there are huge variations in the rate at which wealth is created. At Viaweb we had one programmer who was a sort of monster of productivity. I remember watching what he did one long day and estimating that he had added several hundred thousand dollars to the market value of the company. A great programmer, on a roll, could create a million dollars worth of wealth in a couple weeks. A mediocre programmer over the same period will generate zero or even negative wealth (e.g. by introducing bugs).

这就是为什么这么多优秀的程序员都是自由意志主义者。在我们的世界里,你非生即死,没有任何借口。当那些远离财富创造的人——大学生、记者、政客——听说最富有的 5% 的人拥有总财富的一半时,他们往往会认为这是不公正的! 一个经验丰富的程序员则更有可能想:才这么点? 顶尖 5% 的程序员可能写出了 99% 的优秀软件。

This is why so many of the best programmers are libertarians. In our world, you sink or swim, and there are no excuses. When those far removed from the creation of wealth-- undergraduates, reporters, politicians-- hear that the richest 5% of the people have half the total wealth, they tend to think injustice! An experienced programmer would be more likely to think is that all? The top 5% of programmers probably write 99% of the good software.

财富可以在不被出售的情况下被创造出来。至少在最近之前,科学家们实际上是在无偿捐献他们创造的财富。因为了解了青霉素,我们都变得更富有,因为我们死于感染的可能性降低了。财富是任何人们想要的东西,而不死自然是我们想要的东西。黑客经常通过编写任何人都可以免费使用的开源软件来捐献他们的工作。运行在我现在使用的电脑上的 FreeBSD 操作系统让我变得富有得多,Yahoo 也是如此,他们在所有的服务器上运行它。

Wealth can be created without being sold. Scientists, till recently at least, effectively donated the wealth they created. We are all richer for knowing about penicillin, because we're less likely to die from infections. Wealth is whatever people want, and not dying is certainly something we want. Hackers often donate their work by writing open source software that anyone can use for free. I am much the richer for the operating system FreeBSD, which I'm running on the computer I'm using now, and so is Yahoo, which runs it on all their servers.

工作是什么

What a Job Is

在工业化国家,人们至少在二十多岁之前都属于某个机构。经过这么多年,你习惯了属于这样一个群体的想法:大家早上起床,去往一组建筑,做一些他们通常并不喜欢做的事情。属于这样一个群体成了你身份的一部分:名字、年龄、角色、机构。如果你必须自我介绍,或者别人描述你,通常会是:约翰·史密斯,10 岁,某某小学的学生,或者约翰·史密斯,20 岁,某某大学的学生。

In industrialized countries, people belong to one institution or another at least until their twenties. After all those years you get used to the idea of belonging to a group of people who all get up in the morning, go to some set of buildings, and do things that they do not, ordinarily, enjoy doing. Belonging to such a group becomes part of your identity: name, age, role, institution. If you have to introduce yourself, or someone else describes you, it will be as something like, John Smith, age 10, a student at such and such elementary school, or John Smith, age 20, a student at such and such college.

当约翰·史密斯毕业时,他被期望去找一份工作。而找一份工作似乎意味着加入另一个机构。表面上看,这很像大学。你选择你想去工作的公司并申请加入。如果有一家看中你,你就成了这个新群体的成员。你早上起床,去往一组新的建筑,做一些你通常并不喜欢做的事情。也有一些不同:生活没有那么有趣了,而且你现在能拿到报酬,而不是像在大学里那样需要付钱。但相似之处感觉大于差异。约翰·史密斯现在成了:约翰·史密斯,22 岁,某某公司的软件开发人员。

When John Smith finishes school he is expected to get a job. And what getting a job seems to mean is joining another institution. Superficially it's a lot like college. You pick the companies you want to work for and apply to join them. If one likes you, you become a member of this new group. You get up in the morning and go to a new set of buildings, and do things that you do not, ordinarily, enjoy doing. There are a few differences: life is not as much fun, and you get paid, instead of paying, as you did in college. But the similarities feel greater than the differences. John Smith is now John Smith, 22, a software developer at such and such corporation.

实际上,约翰·史密斯的生活发生的变化比他意识到的要多。在社交上,公司看起来很像大学,但你越深入了解底层现实,就会发现它越发不同。

In fact John Smith's life has changed more than he realizes. Socially, a company looks much like college, but the deeper you go into the underlying reality, the more different it gets.

一家公司所做的,以及如果它想继续存在就必须做的事情,就是赚钱。而大多数公司赚钱的方式是创造财富。公司可能会高度专业化,以至于这种相似性被掩盖了,但并非只有制造型公司才创造财富。财富的一个重要组成部分是位置。还记得那台可以为你造车、做饭的神奇机器吗?如果它把你的晚餐送到中亚的某个随机地点,它就没那么有用了。如果财富意味着人们想要的东西,那么运输物品的公司也在创造财富。对于许多其他不制造任何实体物品的公司也是如此。几乎所有的公司存在都是为了做一些人们想要的东西。

What a company does, and has to do if it wants to continue to exist, is earn money. And the way most companies make money is by creating wealth. Companies can be so specialized that this similarity is concealed, but it is not only manufacturing companies that create wealth. A big component of wealth is location. Remember that magic machine that could make you cars and cook you dinner and so on? It would not be so useful if it delivered your dinner to a random location in central Asia. If wealth means what people want, companies that move things also create wealth. Ditto for many other kinds of companies that don't make anything physical. Nearly all companies exist to do something people want.

当你去一家公司工作时,你也是在做同样的事情。但在这里,还有另一层因素往往掩盖了底层的现实。在公司里,你所做的工作是与许多其他人的工作平均在一起的。你甚至可能意识不到自己在做人们想要的事情。你的贡献可能是间接的。但公司作为一个整体必须给人们提供他们想要的东西,否则他们就赚不到钱。如果他们每年付给你 x 美元,那么平均而言,你每年必须贡献至少价值 x 美元的工作,否则公司的支出将超过收入,最终导致破产。

And that's what you do, as well, when you go to work for a company. But here there is another layer that tends to obscure the underlying reality. In a company, the work you do is averaged together with a lot of other people's. You may not even be aware you're doing something people want. Your contribution may be indirect. But the company as a whole must be giving people something they want, or they won't make any money. And if they are paying you x dollars a year, then on average you must be contributing at least x dollars a year worth of work, or the company will be spending more than it makes, and will go out of business.

一个刚从大学毕业的人认为,并且被告知,他需要找一份工作,就好像最重要的事情是成为某个机构的成员。一个更直接的说法是:你需要开始做一些人们想要的事情。你不需要加入一家公司来做到这一点。公司不过是一群人为了做人们想要的事情而聚在一起。做人们想要的事情才重要,而不是加入这个群体。[6]

Someone graduating from college thinks, and is told, that he needs to get a job, as if the important thing were becoming a member of an institution. A more direct way to put it would be: you need to start doing something people want. You don't need to join a company to do that. All a company is is a group of people working together to do something people want. It's doing something people want that matters, not joining the group. [6]

对大多数人来说,最好的计划可能是去一家现有的公司工作。但在你这样做的时候,理解正在发生的事情是个好主意。一份工作意味着做一些人们想要的事情,并与该公司中的其他人平均在一起。

For most people the best plan probably is to go to work for some existing company. But it is a good idea to understand what's happening when you do this. A job means doing something people want, averaged together with everyone else in that company.

更努力地工作

Working Harder

这种平均化成了一个问题。我认为困扰大公司的最大单一问题是难以衡量每个人的工作价值。在大多数情况下,他们选择了放弃。在大公司里,你只要工作还算努力,就能拿到相当可预测的薪水。你被期望不要表现出明显的无能或懒惰,但你也不被期望把一生的精力都投入到工作中。

That averaging gets to be a problem. I think the single biggest problem afflicting large companies is the difficulty of assigning a value to each person's work. For the most part they punt. In a big company you get paid a fairly predictable salary for working fairly hard. You're expected not to be obviously incompetent or lazy, but you're not expected to devote your whole life to your work.

然而事实证明,你为工作投入多少精力是存在规模效应的。在合适的行业中,一个真正全身心投入工作的人所创造的财富,可以达到普通员工的十倍甚至一百倍。例如,一个程序员不再是慢慢吞吞地维护和更新现有的软件,而是可以编写一个全新的软件,并以此创造一个新的收入来源。

It turns out, though, that there are economies of scale in how much of your life you devote to your work. In the right kind of business, someone who really devoted himself to work could generate ten or even a hundred times as much wealth as an average employee. A programmer, for example, instead of chugging along maintaining and updating an existing piece of software, could write a whole new piece of software, and with it create a new source of revenue.

公司的机制并不是为了回报那些想这样做的人而设计的。你不能去找你的老板说:“我想开始十倍努力地工作,所以请付给我十倍的薪水好吗?”一方面,官方的虚构说法是,你已经尽了最大努力。但更严重的问题是,公司无法衡量你工作的价值。

Companies are not set up to reward people who want to do this. You can't go to your boss and say, I'd like to start working ten times as hard, so will you please pay me ten times as much? For one thing, the official fiction is that you are already working as hard as you can. But a more serious problem is that the company has no way of measuring the value of your work.

销售人员是个例外。他们创造了多少收入很容易衡量,而且他们通常拿按比例提成。如果一个销售人员想更努力地工作,他只需开始行动,就会自动按比例获得更多报酬。

Salesmen are an exception. It's easy to measure how much revenue they generate, and they're usually paid a percentage of it. If a salesman wants to work harder, he can just start doing it, and he will automatically get paid proportionally more.

除了销售之外,大公司还可以雇佣一流人才的另一个职位是:高层管理职位。原因也是一样的:他们的绩效是可以衡量的。高层管理人员要对整个公司的业绩负责。因为普通员工的绩效通常无法衡量,所以他只需要付出正常的努力即可。而高层管理人员和销售人员一样,必须拿出实际的数据。一家倒闭的公司的 CEO 不能辩解说自己付出了正常的努力。如果公司表现糟糕,他就表现糟糕。

There is one other job besides sales where big companies can hire first-rate people: in the top management jobs. And for the same reason: their performance can be measured. The top managers are held responsible for the performance of the entire company. Because an ordinary employee's performance can't usually be measured, he is not expected to do more than put in a solid effort. Whereas top management, like salespeople, have to actually come up with the numbers. The CEO of a company that tanks cannot plead that he put in a solid effort. If the company does badly, he's done badly.

一家能够如此直接地付给所有员工报酬的公司将会获得巨大的成功。如果能因此获得报酬,许多员工会更努力地工作。更重要的是,这样的公司会吸引那些特别想努力工作的人。它将彻底击败竞争对手。

A company that could pay all its employees so straightforwardly would be enormously successful. Many employees would work harder if they could get paid for it. More importantly, such a company would attract people who wanted to work especially hard. It would crush its competitors.

不幸的是,公司不能像对待销售人员那样对待每个人。销售人员是独立工作的。大多数员工的工作是交织在一起的。假设一家公司制造某种消费电子产品。工程师们制造了一个性能可靠、具有各种新功能的设备;工业设计师为其设计了一个漂亮的外壳;然后营销人员说服所有人这是他们必须拥有的东西。你如何知道该设备的销量有多少归功于每个团队的努力?或者,就此而言,有多少归功于过去那些让公司赢得质量声誉的产品创造者?没有办法理清他们所有的贡献。即使你能读懂消费者的心思,你也会发现这些因素都模糊地交织在一起。

Unfortunately, companies can't pay everyone like salesmen. Salesmen work alone. Most employees' work is tangled together. Suppose a company makes some kind of consumer gadget. The engineers build a reliable gadget with all kinds of new features; the industrial designers design a beautiful case for it; and then the marketing people convince everyone that it's something they've got to have. How do you know how much of the gadget's sales are due to each group's efforts? Or, for that matter, how much is due to the creators of past gadgets that gave the company a reputation for quality? There's no way to untangle all their contributions. Even if you could read the minds of the consumers, you'd find these factors were all blurred together.

如果你想走得更快,你的工作与大量其他人的工作交织在一起就会成为一个问题。在一个大团体中,你的绩效无法被单独衡量——而团体的其他人会拖慢你的速度。

If you want to go faster, it's a problem to have your work tangled together with a large number of other people's. In a large group, your performance is not separately measurable-- and the rest of the group slows you down.

可衡量性与杠杆率

Measurement and Leverage

要变富有,你需要让自己处于拥有两样东西的境地:可衡量性和杠杆率。你需要在你的绩效可以被衡量的岗位上,否则就无法通过做更多的事情来获得更多报酬。而且你必须拥有杠杆率,即你所做的决定能产生巨大的影响。

To get rich you need to get yourself in a situation with two things, measurement and leverage. You need to be in a position where your performance can be measured, or there is no way to get paid more by doing more. And you have to have leverage, in the sense that the decisions you make have a big effect.

仅有可衡量性是不够的。一个有可衡量性但没有杠杆率的工作例子是在血汗工厂里做计件工。你的绩效被衡量并据此获得报酬,但你没有做决定的空间。你唯一能做的决定就是你工作有多快,而这可能只能让你的收入增加两到三倍。

Measurement alone is not enough. An example of a job with measurement but not leverage is doing piecework in a sweatshop. Your performance is measured and you get paid accordingly, but you have no scope for decisions. The only decision you get to make is how fast you work, and that can probably only increase your earnings by a factor of two or three.

一个兼具可衡量性和杠杆率的工作例子是电影中的男主角。你的绩效可以通过电影的票房来衡量。而且你拥有杠杆率,因为你的表演可以决定这部电影的成败。

An example of a job with both measurement and leverage would be lead actor in a movie. Your performance can be measured in the gross of the movie. And you have leverage in the sense that your performance can make or break it.

CEO 也同时拥有可衡量性和杠杆率。他们是被衡量的,因为公司的表现就是他们的表现。他们拥有杠杆率,因为他们的决策会让整个公司朝一个方向或另一个方向前进。

CEOs also have both measurement and leverage. They're measured, in that the performance of the company is their performance. And they have leverage in that their decisions set the whole company moving in one direction or another.

我认为,每一个靠自己努力致富的人,都会发现自己处于一个兼具可衡量性和杠杆率的境地。我能想到的每个人都是如此:CEO、电影明星、对冲基金经理、职业运动员。判断是否存在杠杆率的一个好暗示是失败的可能性。收益必须与损失相平衡,因此,如果存在巨大的潜在收益,也必须存在可怕的损失可能性。CEO、明星、基金经理和运动员都过着头悬利剑的生活;他们一旦开始表现糟糕,就会被淘汰。如果你的工作感觉很安全,你是不会变富有的,因为如果没有危险,几乎可以肯定没有杠杆率。

I think everyone who gets rich by their own efforts will be found to be in a situation with measurement and leverage. Everyone I can think of does: CEOs, movie stars, hedge fund managers, professional athletes. A good hint to the presence of leverage is the possibility of failure. Upside must be balanced by downside, so if there is big potential for gain there must also be a terrifying possibility of loss. CEOs, stars, fund managers, and athletes all live with the sword hanging over their heads; the moment they start to suck, they're out. If you're in a job that feels safe, you are not going to get rich, because if there is no danger there is almost certainly no leverage.

但你不需要成为 CEO 或电影明星就能处于兼具可衡量性和杠杆率的境地。你只需要成为解决艰难问题的小团队中的一员。

But you don't have to become a CEO or a movie star to be in a situation with measurement and leverage. All you need to do is be part of a small group working on a hard problem.

小规模 = 可衡量性

Smallness = Measurement

如果你无法衡量单个员工所做工作的价值,你可以接近这一步。你可以衡量小团队所做工作的价值。

If you can't measure the value of the work done by individual employees, you can get close. You can measure the value of the work done by small groups.

在整个公司层面上,你可以准确衡量员工创造的收入。当公司规模很小时,你就非常接近衡量单个员工的贡献了。一个可行的创业公司可能只有十名员工,这让你在衡量个人努力时,误差控制在十倍以内。

One level at which you can accurately measure the revenue generated by employees is at the level of the whole company. When the company is small, you are thereby fairly close to measuring the contributions of individual employees. A viable startup might only have ten employees, which puts you within a factor of ten of measuring individual effort.

因此,创办或加入一家创业公司,是大多数人最接近对老板说“我想十倍努力工作,请付给我十倍报酬”的方式。这里有两个不同之处:你不是对你的老板说,而是直接对客户说(毕竟老板只是客户的代理人),而且你不是一个人在做,而是和一小群同样有野心的人一起做。

Starting or joining a startup is thus as close as most people can get to saying to one's boss, I want to work ten times as hard, so please pay me ten times as much. There are two differences: you're not saying it to your boss, but directly to the customers (for whom your boss is only a proxy after all), and you're not doing it individually, but along with a small group of other ambitious people.

通常,这会是一个团队。除了少数不寻常的工作(如演戏或写书)之外,你不能单枪匹马成为一家公司。而且与你共事的人最好很优秀,因为你的工作将与他们的工作平均在一起。

It will, ordinarily, be a group. Except in a few unusual kinds of work, like acting or writing books, you can't be a company of one person. And the people you work with had better be good, because it's their work that yours is going to be averaged with.

大公司就像一艘由一千名桨手驱动的巨型划桨船。有两件事拖慢了这艘船的速度。一是单个桨手看不到更努力工作带来的任何结果。二是,在千人的群体中,平均水平的桨手很可能非常平庸。

A big company is like a giant galley driven by a thousand rowers. Two things keep the speed of the galley down. One is that individual rowers don't see any result from working harder. The other is that, in a group of a thousand people, the average rower is likely to be pretty average.

如果你从那艘大船上随机挑选十个人,让他们自己坐一条船,他们可能会划得更快。他们将同时拥有胡萝卜和大棒来激励他们。一个精力充沛的桨手会因为想到自己能对船速产生显而易见的影响而受到鼓舞。如果有谁偷懒,其他人更容易注意到并抱怨。

If you took ten people at random out of the big galley and put them in a boat by themselves, they could probably go faster. They would have both carrot and stick to motivate them. An energetic rower would be encouraged by the thought that he could have a visible effect on the speed of the boat. And if someone was lazy, the others would be more likely to notice and complain.

但当你把大船上最好的十个桨手挑出来放在同一条船上时,十人船的真正优势才显现出来。他们将拥有身处小团队带来的所有额外动力。但更重要的是,通过挑选如此小的群体,你可以得到最好的桨手。每一个都将处于前 1%。对他们来说,将自己的工作与一小群同行平均在一起,比与所有人平均在一起,是一笔划算得多的交易。

But the real advantage of the ten-man boat shows when you take the ten best rowers out of the big galley and put them in a boat together. They will have all the extra motivation that comes from being in a small group. But more importantly, by selecting that small a group you can get the best rowers. Each one will be in the top 1%. It's a much better deal for them to average their work together with a small group of their peers than to average it with everyone.

这才是创业公司的真正意义。理想情况下,你与一群同样想比在大公司更努力工作、拿更多报酬的人聚在一起。而且由于创业公司往往是由已经彼此了解(至少听过名声)的有野心的人自发组成的群体,因此其可衡量性比单纯的小规模更精确。创业公司不仅是十个人,而是十个像你一样的人。

That's the real point of startups. Ideally, you are getting together with a group of other people who also want to work a lot harder, and get paid a lot more, than they would in a big company. And because startups tend to get founded by self-selecting groups of ambitious people who already know one another (at least by reputation), the level of measurement is more precise than you get from smallness alone. A startup is not merely ten people, but ten people like you.

史蒂夫·乔布斯曾说过,创业公司的成败取决于前十名员工。我同意。如果说有什么不同的话,那更像是前五名。小规模本身并不是创业公司大杀四方的原因,而是因为小团队可以做到精挑细选。你不需要村庄意义上的小,而是需要全明星队意义上的小。

Steve Jobs once said that the success or failure of a startup depends on the first ten employees. I agree. If anything, it's more like the first five. Being small is not, in itself, what makes startups kick butt, but rather that small groups can be select. You don't want small in the sense of a village, but small in the sense of an all-star team.

群体越大,其平均成员就越接近整个人口的平均水平。因此,在其他条件相同的情况下,大公司里一个非常有能力的人可能得到了一笔糟糕的交易,因为他的绩效被其他人普遍较低的绩效拉低了。当然,其他条件往往并不相同:有能力的人可能不在乎钱,或者可能更喜欢大公司的稳定性。但是一个非常有能力且确实在乎钱的人,通常去和一小群同行一起工作会表现得更好。

The larger a group, the closer its average member will be to the average for the population as a whole. So all other things being equal, a very able person in a big company is probably getting a bad deal, because his performance is dragged down by the overall lower performance of the others. Of course, all other things often are not equal: the able person may not care about money, or may prefer the stability of a large company. But a very able person who does care about money will ordinarily do better to go off and work with a small group of peers.

技术 = 杠杆率

Technology = Leverage

创业公司为任何人提供了一种处于兼具可衡量性和杠杆率境地的方法。它们因为规模小而实现了可衡量性,又因为通过发明新技术赚钱而提供了杠杆率。

Startups offer anyone a way to be in a situation with measurement and leverage. They allow measurement because they're small, and they offer leverage because they make money by inventing new technology.

什么是技术?它是技术(方法)。它是我们做事的方式。当你发现一种做事的新方法时,它的价值就会乘以所有使用它的人。这就是传说中的钓鱼竿,而不是鱼。这就是创业公司与餐馆或理发店的区别。你一次为一个顾客煎鸡蛋或理发。而如果你解决了一个很多人都关心的技术问题,你就帮助了每一个使用你解决方案的人。这就是杠杆率。

What is technology? It's technique. It's the way we all do things. And when you discover a new way to do things, its value is multiplied by all the people who use it. It is the proverbial fishing rod, rather than the fish. That's the difference between a startup and a restaurant or a barber shop. You fry eggs or cut hair one customer at a time. Whereas if you solve a technical problem that a lot of people care about, you help everyone who uses your solution. That's leverage.

纵观历史,似乎大多数通过创造财富致富的人都是通过开发新技术实现的。你只是无法足够快地煎鸡蛋或理发。让 1200 年的佛罗伦萨人富有的是发现了制造当时高科技产品——精细织布的新技术。让 1600 年的荷兰人富有的是发现了造船和航海技术,使他们能够称霸远东海域。

If you look at history, it seems that most people who got rich by creating wealth did it by developing new technology. You just can't fry eggs or cut hair fast enough. What made the Florentines rich in 1200 was the discovery of new techniques for making the high-tech product of the time, fine woven cloth. What made the Dutch rich in 1600 was the discovery of shipbuilding and navigation techniques that enabled them to dominate the seas of the Far East.

幸运的是,小规模与解决难题之间存在天然的契合。技术前沿变化迅速。今天有价值的技术,几年后可能就一文不值了。小公司在这个世界里更如鱼得水,因为他们没有层层官僚机构来拖慢他们的速度。此外,技术进步往往来自非正统的方法,而小公司受传统观念的束缚较少。

Fortunately there is a natural fit between smallness and solving hard problems. The leading edge of technology moves fast. Technology that's valuable today could be worthless in a couple years. Small companies are more at home in this world, because they don't have layers of bureaucracy to slow them down. Also, technical advances tend to come from unorthodox approaches, and small companies are less constrained by convention.

大公司可以开发技术。他们只是无法快速完成。他们的规模使他们变得缓慢,并阻止他们为员工付出的非凡努力提供回报。因此,在实践中,大公司只在那些需要巨额资金、使创业公司无法与其竞争的领域开发技术,如微处理器、发电厂或客机。即便在这些领域,他们也严重依赖创业公司提供零部件和创意。

Big companies can develop technology. They just can't do it quickly. Their size makes them slow and prevents them from rewarding employees for the extraordinary effort required. So in practice big companies only get to develop technology in fields where large capital requirements prevent startups from competing with them, like microprocessors, power plants, or passenger aircraft. And even in those fields they depend heavily on startups for components and ideas.

显而易见,生物技术或软件创业公司的存在是为了解决艰难的技术问题,但我认为在那些看起来与技术无关的业务中也是如此。例如,麦当劳通过设计一个系统——麦当劳特许经营权——而做大,然后这个系统可以在地球上任意复制。麦当劳的特许经营权受极度精确的规则控制,以至于它几乎就是一段软件。一次编写,到处运行。沃尔玛也是如此。山姆·沃尔顿致富不是因为他是个零售商,而是因为他设计了一种新型的商店。

It's obvious that biotech or software startups exist to solve hard technical problems, but I think it will also be found to be true in businesses that don't seem to be about technology. McDonald's, for example, grew big by designing a system, the McDonald's franchise, that could then be reproduced at will all over the face of the earth. A McDonald's franchise is controlled by rules so precise that it is practically a piece of software. Write once, run everywhere. Ditto for Wal-Mart. Sam Walton got rich not by being a retailer, but by designing a new kind of store.

不仅在选择公司的总体目标时,而且在沿途的决策点上,都要将困难程度作为指南。在 Viaweb,我们的经验法则之一是往楼上跑。假设你是一个矮小、敏捷的人,被一个高大、肥胖的恶棍追赶。你打开一扇门,发现自己身处楼梯间。你是往上走还是往下走?我说往上。这个恶棍下楼的速度可能和你一样快。上楼时,他的庞大体型将是一个更大的劣势。往楼上跑对你来说很难,但对他来说更难。

Use difficulty as a guide not just in selecting the overall aim of your company, but also at decision points along the way. At Viaweb one of our rules of thumb was run upstairs. Suppose you are a little, nimble guy being chased by a big, fat, bully. You open a door and find yourself in a staircase. Do you go up or down? I say up. The bully can probably run downstairs as fast as you can. Going upstairs his bulk will be more of a disadvantage. Running upstairs is hard for you but even harder for him.

这在实践中的意味着,我们刻意寻找难题。如果我们的软件可以添加两个功能,两者的价值与其困难程度成正比,我们总是会选择较难的那个。不仅因为它更有价值,还因为它是更难的。我们乐于强迫更大、更慢的竞争对手在困难的领域跟在我们后面。就像游击队一样,创业公司更喜欢山区的险峻地形,因为中央政府的军队无法跟随。我记得有几次,在与一些可怕的技术问题斗争了一整天之后,我们疲惫不堪。而我会很高兴,因为对我们来说很难的事情,对我们的竞争对手来说将是不可能的。

What this meant in practice was that we deliberately sought hard problems. If there were two features we could add to our software, both equally valuable in proportion to their difficulty, we'd always take the harder one. Not just because it was more valuable, but because it was harder. We delighted in forcing bigger, slower competitors to follow us over difficult ground. Like guerillas, startups prefer the difficult terrain of the mountains, where the troops of the central government can't follow. I can remember times when we were just exhausted after wrestling all day with some horrible technical problem. And I'd be delighted, because something that was hard for us would be impossible for our competitors.

这不仅仅是运营创业公司的好方法。这就是创业公司本身。风险投资人了解这一点,并为此发明了一个词:准入门槛。如果你带着一个新创意去找风险投资人并要求他投资,他最先问的问题之一将是,其他人开发这个有多难?也就是说,你在自己和潜在追随者之间设置了多少困难的障碍?[7] 你最好对为什么你的技术难以复制有一个令人信服的解释。否则,一旦某家大公司意识到这一点,他们就会自己做一个,并凭借其品牌、资金和渠道优势,在一夜之间夺走你的市场。你就会像在开阔地带被正规军包围的游击队一样。

This is not just a good way to run a startup. It's what a startup is. Venture capitalists know about this and have a phrase for it: barriers to entry. If you go to a VC with a new idea and ask him to invest in it, one of the first things he'll ask is, how hard would this be for someone else to develop? That is, how much difficult ground have you put between yourself and potential pursuers? [7] And you had better have a convincing explanation of why your technology would be hard to duplicate. Otherwise as soon as some big company becomes aware of it, they'll make their own, and with their brand name, capital, and distribution clout, they'll take away your market overnight. You'd be like guerillas caught in the open field by regular army forces.

建立准入门槛的一种方法是通过专利。但专利可能无法提供太多保护。竞争对手通常会找到绕过专利的方法。如果他们不能,他们可能干脆违反专利并邀请你起诉他们。大公司不怕被起诉,这对他们来说是家常便饭。他们会确保起诉他们既昂贵又耗时。听说过菲洛·法恩斯沃斯吗?他发明了电视。你从未听说过他的原因,是因为他的公司没有从中赚钱。[8] 赚钱的公司是 RCA,而法恩斯沃斯因其努力得到的报酬是长达十年的专利诉讼。

One way to put up barriers to entry is through patents. But patents may not provide much protection. Competitors commonly find ways to work around a patent. And if they can't, they may simply violate it and invite you to sue them. A big company is not afraid to be sued; it's an everyday thing for them. They'll make sure that suing them is expensive and takes a long time. Ever heard of Philo Farnsworth? He invented television. The reason you've never heard of him is that his company was not the one to make money from it. [8] The company that did was RCA, and Farnsworth's reward for his efforts was a decade of patent litigation.

在这里,最好的防守通常是进攻。如果你能开发出竞争对手根本无法复制的技术,你就不需要依赖其他防线。首先选择一个难题,然后在每一个决策点,选择更难的那个。[9]

Here, as so often, the best defense is a good offense. If you can develop technology that's simply too hard for competitors to duplicate, you don't need to rely on other defenses. Start by picking a hard problem, and then at every decision point, take the harder choice. [9]

隐藏的代价

The Catch(es)

如果仅仅是比普通员工更努力工作并获得按比例的报酬,那么创办一家创业公司显然是一笔划算的交易。在某种程度上,这会更有趣。我不认为有很多人喜欢大公司的缓慢节奏、冗长的会议、饮水机旁的闲聊、愚蠢的中层管理人员等等。

If it were simply a matter of working harder than an ordinary employee and getting paid proportionately, it would obviously be a good deal to start a startup. Up to a point it would be more fun. I don't think many people like the slow pace of big companies, the interminable meetings, the water-cooler conversations, the clueless middle managers, and so on.

不幸的是,这里有几个隐藏的代价。一是你无法选择你想在曲线上的哪个点生存。例如,你不能决定只想两三倍努力工作,并拿到那么多报酬。当你运营一家创业公司时,你的竞争对手决定了你工作的努力程度。他们几乎都做出了同一个决定:竭尽所能地努力。

Unfortunately there are a couple catches. One is that you can't choose the point on the curve that you want to inhabit. You can't decide, for example, that you'd like to work just two or three times as hard, and get paid that much more. When you're running a startup, your competitors decide how hard you work. And they pretty much all make the same decision: as hard as you possibly can.

另一个隐藏代价是,回报只是平均而言与你的生产力成正比。正如我之前所说,任何公司的成功都有很大的随机乘数。所以在实践中,这笔交易并不是说你的生产力提高了 30 倍,就能拿到 30 倍的报酬。而是说你的生产力提高了 30 倍,得到的报酬在 0 到 1000 倍之间。如果均值是 30 倍,中位数可能就是零。大多数创业公司都会倒闭,而不仅仅是我们在互联网泡沫时期听到的那些宠物食品门户网站。创业公司开发了一个真正优秀的产品,却花得时间稍微长了一点,耗尽了资金,不得不关闭,这是很常见的事情。

The other catch is that the payoff is only on average proportionate to your productivity. There is, as I said before, a large random multiplier in the success of any company. So in practice the deal is not that you're 30 times as productive and get paid 30 times as much. It is that you're 30 times as productive, and get paid between zero and a thousand times as much. If the mean is 30x, the median is probably zero. Most startups tank, and not just the dogfood portals we all heard about during the Internet Bubble. It's common for a startup to be developing a genuinely good product, take slightly too long to do it, run out of money, and have to shut down.

创业公司就像蚊子。熊可以承受一击,螃蟹有外壳保护,但蚊子的设计目的只有一件事:得分。没有能量浪费在防御上。作为物种,蚊子的防御方式是数量众多,但这对于单个蚊子来说几乎没有安慰作用。

A startup is like a mosquito. A bear can absorb a hit and a crab is armored against one, but a mosquito is designed for one thing: to score. No energy is wasted on defense. The defense of mosquitos, as a species, is that there are a lot of them, but this is little consolation to the individual mosquito.

创业公司和蚊子一样,往往是非全即无的命题。而且你通常直到最后一刻才知道你会得到两者中的哪一个。Viaweb 有几次差点倒闭。我们的轨迹就像正弦波。幸运的是,我们在周期的顶点被收购了,但这真是千钧一发。当我们访问加利福尼亚的雅虎讨论向他们出售公司时,我们不得不借用一间会议室来安抚一位即将退出新一轮融资的投资人,而我们需要这笔钱才能活下去。

Startups, like mosquitos, tend to be an all-or-nothing proposition. And you don't generally know which of the two you're going to get till the last minute. Viaweb came close to tanking several times. Our trajectory was like a sine wave. Fortunately we got bought at the top of the cycle, but it was damned close. While we were visiting Yahoo in California to talk about selling the company to them, we had to borrow a conference room to reassure an investor who was about to back out of a new round of funding that we needed to stay alive.

创业公司非全即无的属性并不是我们想要的。Viaweb 的黑客都极其厌恶风险。如果有某种方法可以只拼命工作并获得报酬,而不掺杂彩票成分,我们会很高兴。与 20% 获得 1000 万美元的机会相比,我们更愿意要 100% 获得 100 万美元的机会,尽管从理论上讲,第二种选择的价值是第一种的两倍。不幸的是,目前商业世界中没有任何空间可以让你获得第一种交易。

The all-or-nothing aspect of startups was not something we wanted. Viaweb's hackers were all extremely risk-averse. If there had been some way just to work super hard and get paid for it, without having a lottery mixed in, we would have been delighted. We would have much preferred a 100% chance of $1 million to a 20% chance of $10 million, even though theoretically the second is worth twice as much. Unfortunately, there is not currently any space in the business world where you can get the first deal.

最接近的做法是在早期阶段卖掉你的创业公司,放弃未来的上涨空间(和风险),以换取较小但有保障的回报。我们曾有机会这样做,但愚蠢地(正如我们当时所想的那样)错过了。在那之后,我们变得滑稽地渴望出售。在接下来的大约一年里,只要有人对 Viaweb 表现出最微小的兴趣,我们就会试图把公司卖给他们。但没有人接手,所以我们必须继续前进。

The closest you can get is by selling your startup in the early stages, giving up upside (and risk) for a smaller but guaranteed payoff. We had a chance to do this, and stupidly, as we then thought, let it slip by. After that we became comically eager to sell. For the next year or so, if anyone expressed the slightest curiosity about Viaweb we would try to sell them the company. But there were no takers, so we had to keep going.

在早期阶段收购我们本来是很划算的,但进行收购的公司并不是在寻找划算的交易。一家大到足以收购创业公司的公司,也大到足以相当保守。在公司内部,负责收购的人将是更保守的人,因为他们可能是较晚加入公司的商学院类型。他们宁愿为安全的选​​择付出过高的代价。因此,出售一家成熟的创业公司,即使有很大的溢价,也比出售一家早期的创业公司要容易得多。

It would have been a bargain to buy us at an early stage, but companies doing acquisitions are not looking for bargains. A company big enough to acquire startups will be big enough to be fairly conservative, and within the company the people in charge of acquisitions will be among the more conservative, because they are likely to be business school types who joined the company late. They would rather overpay for a safe choice. So it is easier to sell an established startup, even at a large premium, than an early-stage one.

获取用户

Get Users

我认为如果可以的话,被收购是个好主意。运营一家企业与发展一家企业是不同的。一旦你达到巡航高度,让大公司接管是再好不过了。这在财务上也更明智,因为出售可以让你的资产多元化。你会怎么看待一个将客户所有资产都投入到一只波动性很大的股票中的财务顾问?

I think it's a good idea to get bought, if you can. Running a business is different from growing one. It is just as well to let a big company take over once you reach cruising altitude. It's also financially wiser, because selling allows you to diversify. What would you think of a financial advisor who put all his client's assets into one volatile stock?

你如何被收购?主要是通过做那些你如果不打算出售公司时也会做的事情。例如,实现盈利。但被收购本身也是一门艺术,我们花了很多时间试图掌握它。

How do you get bought? Mostly by doing the same things you'd do if you didn't intend to sell the company. Being profitable, for example. But getting bought is also an art in its own right, and one that we spent a lot of time trying to master.

如果可以的话,潜在买家总是会拖延。被收购最难的部分是让他们采取行动。对大多数人来说,最强大的动力不是对收益的渴望,而是对损失的恐惧。对于潜在的收购者来说,最强大的动力是他们的一个竞争对手会买下你。我们发现,这会让 CEO 们坐红眼航班。第二大担忧是,如果他们现在不买你,你会继续快速成长,以后收购成本会更高,甚至会成为竞争对手。

Potential buyers will always delay if they can. The hard part about getting bought is getting them to act. For most people, the most powerful motivator is not the hope of gain, but the fear of loss. For potential acquirers, the most powerful motivator is the prospect that one of their competitors will buy you. This, as we found, causes CEOs to take red-eyes. The second biggest is the worry that, if they don't buy you now, you'll continue to grow rapidly and will cost more to acquire later, or even become a competitor.

在这两种情况下,归根结底都是用户。你可能会认为一家即将收购你的公司会做大量的研究,并自己决定你的技术有多大价值。完全不是。他们看重的是你拥有的用户数量。

In both cases, what it all comes down to is users. You'd think that a company about to buy you would do a lot of research and decide for themselves how valuable your technology was. Not at all. What they go by is the number of users you have.

实际上,收购方假设客户知道谁拥有最好的技术。这并不像听起来那么愚蠢。用户是你创造财富的唯一真实证明。财富是人们想要的东西,如果人们没有使用你的软件,也许不仅仅是因为你拙劣的营销。也许是因为你没有做出他们想要的东西。

In effect, acquirers assume the customers know who has the best technology. And this is not as stupid as it sounds. Users are the only real proof that you've created wealth. Wealth is what people want, and if people aren't using your software, maybe it's not just because you're bad at marketing. Maybe it's because you haven't made what they want.

风险投资人列出了一份需要注意的危险信号清单。排在最前面的是由技术狂人运营的公司,他们痴迷于解决有趣的技术问题,而不是让用户高兴。在创业公司中,你不仅要努力解决问题。你还要努力解决用户关心的问题。

Venture capitalists have a list of danger signs to watch out for. Near the top is the company run by techno-weenies who are obsessed with solving interesting technical problems, instead of making users happy. In a startup, you're not just trying to solve problems. You're trying to solve problems that users care about.

所以我认为你应该像收购方那样,将用户作为测试标准。将创业公司视为一个优化问题,其中性能通过用户数量来衡量。正如任何尝试过优化软件的人所知,关键在于衡量。当你试图猜测你的程序哪里慢,以及什么能让它更快时,你几乎总是猜错。

So I think you should make users the test, just as acquirers do. Treat a startup as an optimization problem in which performance is measured by number of users. As anyone who has tried to optimize software knows, the key is measurement. When you try to guess where your program is slow, and what would make it faster, you almost always guess wrong.

用户数量可能不是完美的测试标准,但它会非常接近。这是收购方关心的。这是收入赖以生存的基础。这是让竞争对手不高兴的事情。这是给记者和潜在新用户留下深刻印象的事情。当然,这比你先验地认为哪些问题是重要的需要解决的观念要好得多,无论你在技术上多么熟练。

Number of users may not be the perfect test, but it will be very close. It's what acquirers care about. It's what revenues depend on. It's what makes competitors unhappy. It's what impresses reporters, and potential new users. Certainly it's a better test than your a priori notions of what problems are important to solve, no matter how technically adept you are.

除其他外,将创业公司视为优化问题将有助于你避免风险投资人所担心的另一个陷阱,而且确实如此——花很长时间开发产品。现在我们可以将其识别为黑客已经知道要避免的事情:过早优化。尽快推出 1.0 版本。在有一些用户进行衡量之前,你是在根据猜测进行优化。

Among other things, treating a startup as an optimization problem will help you avoid another pitfall that VCs worry about, and rightly-- taking a long time to develop a product. Now we can recognize this as something hackers already know to avoid: premature optimization. Get a version 1.0 out there as soon as you can. Until you have some users to measure, you're optimizing based on guesses.

你在这里需要密切关注的基本原理是:财富是人们想要的东西。如果你计划通过创造财富来变富有,你必须知道人们想要什么。很少有企业真正关注让客户高兴。有多少次你走进一家商店,或者给一家公司打电话,心里带着一丝恐惧?当你听到“您的通话对我们很重要,请不要挂机”时,你会想,哦太好了,现在一切都会好起来的吗?

The ball you need to keep your eye on here is the underlying principle that wealth is what people want. If you plan to get rich by creating wealth, you have to know what people want. So few businesses really pay attention to making customers happy. How often do you walk into a store, or call a company on the phone, with a feeling of dread in the back of your mind? When you hear "your call is important to us, please stay on the line," do you think, oh good, now everything will be all right?

餐馆偶尔提供一顿烧焦的晚餐还承受得起。但在技术上,你做了一样东西,所有人都在吃。因此,人们想要的东西与你交付的东西之间的任何差异都会被放大。你是在批发式地取悦或惹恼客户。你越接近他们想要的东西,你产生的财富就越多。

A restaurant can afford to serve the occasional burnt dinner. But in technology, you cook one thing and that's what everyone eats. So any difference between what people want and what you deliver is multiplied. You please or annoy customers wholesale. The closer you can get to what they want, the more wealth you generate.

财富与权力

Wealth and Power

创造财富并不是致富的唯一途径。在人类历史的大部分时间里,它甚至不是最常见的。直到几个世纪前,财富的主要来源是矿山、奴隶和农奴、土地和牲畜,而迅速获得这些财富的唯一途径是通过继承、联姻、征服或没收。自然地,财富名声不好。

Making wealth is not the only way to get rich. For most of human history it has not even been the most common. Until a few centuries ago, the main sources of wealth were mines, slaves and serfs, land, and cattle, and the only ways to acquire these rapidly were by inheritance, marriage, conquest, or confiscation. Naturally wealth had a bad reputation.

有两件事改变了。第一是法治。在世界历史的大部分时间里,如果你确实积累了一笔财富,统治者或其走卒总会想办法偷走它。但在中世纪的欧洲,发生了一些新事情。一个新的商人和制造商阶层开始在城镇聚集。[10] 他们团结起来能够抵抗当地的封建领主。因此,在我们的历史上,恶霸们第一次停止了抢夺书呆子的午餐钱。这自然是一个巨大的激励,并且可能确实是第二个大变化——工业化的主要原因。

Two things changed. The first was the rule of law. For most of the world's history, if you did somehow accumulate a fortune, the ruler or his henchmen would find a way to steal it. But in medieval Europe something new happened. A new class of merchants and manufacturers began to collect in towns. [10] Together they were able to withstand the local feudal lord. So for the first time in our history, the bullies stopped stealing the nerds' lunch money. This was naturally a great incentive, and possibly indeed the main cause of the second big change, industrialization.

关于工业革命的原因,已经有了大量的著作。但一个必要条件(如果不是充分条件的话)肯定是以合法方式创造财富的人能够和平地享受这些财富。[11] 一个证据是那些试图回到旧模式的国家的遭遇,比如苏联,以及在较小程度上 20 世纪 60 年代和 70 年代初工党政府治下的英国。拿走财富的激励,技术创新就会停滞不前。

A great deal has been written about the causes of the Industrial Revolution. But surely a necessary, if not sufficient, condition was that people who made fortunes be able to enjoy them in peace. [11] One piece of evidence is what happened to countries that tried to return to the old model, like the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent Britain under the labor governments of the 1960s and early 1970s. Take away the incentive of wealth, and technical innovation grinds to a halt.

记住,从经济学角度来看,创业公司是什么:一种说“我想工作得更快”的方式。我不想通过在五十年内获得定期工资来慢慢积累资金,而是想尽快把这件事做完。因此,禁止你积累财富的政府实际上是在命令你缓慢工作。他们愿意让你在五十年内赚到 300 万美元,但他们不愿意让你如此努力工作以至于在两年内就能做到。他们就像那个你无法去找他说“我想十倍努力工作,所以请付给我十倍报酬”的公司老板。只不过这个老板你无法通过创办自己的公司来逃避。

Remember what a startup is, economically: a way of saying, I want to work faster. Instead of accumulating money slowly by being paid a regular wage for fifty years, I want to get it over with as soon as possible. So governments that forbid you to accumulate wealth are in effect decreeing that you work slowly. They're willing to let you earn $3 million over fifty years, but they're not willing to let you work so hard that you can do it in two. They are like the corporate boss that you can't go to and say, I want to work ten times as hard, so please pay me ten times a much. Except this is not a boss you can escape by starting your own company.

缓慢工作的问题不仅在于技术创新发生得慢。而在于它往往根本不会发生。只有当你刻意寻找难题,以此作为最大程度利用速度优势的方式时,你才会承担这类项目。开发新技术是一件极其痛苦的事情。正如爱迪生所说,它是百分之一的灵感加上百分之九十九的汗水。没有财富的激励,没有人愿意去做。工程师会为了普通的薪水而致力于战斗机和登月火箭等性感项目,但像灯泡或半导体这样更平凡的技术必须由创业者来开发。

The problem with working slowly is not just that technical innovation happens slowly. It's that it tends not to happen at all. It's only when you're deliberately looking for hard problems, as a way to use speed to the greatest advantage, that you take on this kind of project. Developing new technology is a pain in the ass. It is, as Edison said, one percent inspiration and ninety-nine percent perspiration. Without the incentive of wealth, no one wants to do it. Engineers will work on sexy projects like fighter planes and moon rockets for ordinary salaries, but more mundane technologies like light bulbs or semiconductors have to be developed by entrepreneurs.

创业公司不仅仅是过去几十年在硅谷发生的事情。自从通过创造财富致富成为可能以来,每个做到这一点的人基本上都使用了相同的秘诀:可衡量性和杠杆率,其中可衡量性来自与一个小团队共事,而杠杆率来自开发新技术。这个秘诀在 1200 年的佛罗伦萨与今天在圣克拉拉是一样的。

Startups are not just something that happened in Silicon Valley in the last couple decades. Since it became possible to get rich by creating wealth, everyone who has done it has used essentially the same recipe: measurement and leverage, where measurement comes from working with a small group, and leverage from developing new techniques. The recipe was the same in Florence in 1200 as it is in Santa Clara today.

理解这一点可能有助于回答一个重要问题:为什么欧洲变得如此强大。是欧洲的地理原因吗?是欧洲人在种族上更优越吗?是他们的宗教吗?答案(或者至少是直接原因)可能是欧洲人乘上了一个强大的新思想的浪潮:允许那些赚了很多钱的人保留它。

Understanding this may help to answer an important question: why Europe grew so powerful. Was it something about the geography of Europe? Was it that Europeans are somehow racially superior? Was it their religion? The answer (or at least the proximate cause) may be that the Europeans rode on the crest of a powerful new idea: allowing those who made a lot of money to keep it.

一旦你被允许这样做,想要变富有的人就可以通过创造财富而不是偷窃来致富。由此带来的技术增长不仅转化为财富,还转化为军事力量。导致隐形飞机的理论是由一位苏联数学家开发的。但因为苏联没有计算机行业,这对他来说仍然是一个理论。他们没有能力足够快地执行计算以设计出实际飞机的硬件。

Once you're allowed to do that, people who want to get rich can do it by generating wealth instead of stealing it. The resulting technological growth translates not only into wealth but into military power. The theory that led to the stealth plane was developed by a Soviet mathematician. But because the Soviet Union didn't have a computer industry, it remained for them a theory; they didn't have hardware capable of executing the calculations fast enough to design an actual airplane.

在这方面,冷战与第二次世界大战以及近现代的大多数战争教授了相同的教训。不要让由战士和政客组成的统治阶层压制创业者。让个人变富有的秘诀同样能让国家强大。让书呆子保留他们的午餐钱,你就能统治世界。

In that respect the Cold War teaches the same lesson as World War II and, for that matter, most wars in recent history. Don't let a ruling class of warriors and politicians squash the entrepreneurs. The same recipe that makes individuals rich makes countries powerful. Let the nerds keep their lunch money, and you rule the world.

注释

Notes

[1] 你往往只有在创业公司才能获得的一样宝贵东西是免受打扰。不同类型的工作有不同的时间量化单位。校对原稿的人可能每十五分钟被打断一次,而生产力几乎没有损失。但是写代码的时间量化单位非常长:可能需要一个小时才能把问题装进脑子里。因此,让人事部门的人打电话给你询问你忘记填写的表格,其代价可能是巨大的。

[1] One valuable thing you tend to get only in startups is uninterruptability. Different kinds of work have different time quanta. Someone proofreading a manuscript could probably be interrupted every fifteen minutes with little loss of productivity. But the time quantum for hacking is very long: it might take an hour just to load a problem into your head. So the cost of having someone from personnel call you about a form you forgot to fill out can be huge.

这就是为什么黑客在从屏幕前转过身回答你的问题时,会给你如此不友善的注视。在他们的脑海里,一座巨大的纸牌屋正在摇摇欲坠。

This is why hackers give you such a baleful stare as they turn from their screen to answer your question. Inside their heads a giant house of cards is tottering.

仅仅是被打扰的可能性就会阻碍黑客开始艰难的项目。这就是为什么他们倾向于在深夜工作,以及为什么在隔间里几乎不可能写出伟大的软件(除了在深夜)。

The mere possibility of being interrupted deters hackers from starting hard projects. This is why they tend to work late at night, and why it's next to impossible to write great software in a cubicle (except late at night).

创业公司的一个巨大优势是他们还没有任何会打扰你的人。没有人员部门,因此没有表格,也没有人会为此打电话给你。

One great advantage of startups is that they don't yet have any of the people who interrupt you. There is no personnel department, and thus no form nor anyone to call you about it.

[2] 面对为创业公司工作的人其效率可能是大公司员工的 20 或 30 倍这一想法,大公司的管理人员自然会想,我该如何让我手下的人做到这一点?答案很简单:付钱让他们去做。

[2] Faced with the idea that people working for startups might be 20 or 30 times as productive as those working for large companies, executives at large companies will naturally wonder, how could I get the people working for me to do that? The answer is simple: pay them to.

在内部,大多数公司都像共产主义国家一样运转。如果你相信自由市场,为什么不把你的公司变成一个自由市场呢?

Internally most companies are run like Communist states. If you believe in free markets, why not turn your company into one?

假设:当每个员工获得的报酬与他们产生的财富成正比时,公司的利润将最大化。

Hypothesis: A company will be maximally profitable when each employee is paid in proportion to the wealth they generate.

[3] 直到最近,甚至政府有时也无法理解金钱和财富之间的区别。亚当·斯密(《国富论》,v:i)提到过几个试图通过禁止金银出口来保留其“财富”的国家。但是拥有更多的交易媒介并不能让一个国家更富有。如果你有更多的钱追逐相同数量的物质财富,唯一的结果就是更高的价格。

[3] Until recently even governments sometimes didn't grasp the distinction between money and wealth. Adam Smith (Wealth of Nations, v:i) mentions several that tried to preserve their "wealth" by forbidding the export of gold or silver. But having more of the medium of exchange would not make a country richer; if you have more money chasing the same amount of material wealth, the only result is higher prices.

[4] “财富”这个词有很多含义,并非所有含义都是物质的。我在这里并不是想就哪种是真正的财富做出深刻的哲学阐述。我写的是这个词的一种具体的、相当技术性的含义:人们愿意付钱给你的东西。这是一种值得研究的有趣财富,因为它是那种防止你挨饿的财富。而人们愿意付钱给你的东西取决于他们,而不是你。

[4] There are many senses of the word "wealth," not all of them material. I'm not trying to make a deep philosophical point here about which is the true kind. I'm writing about one specific, rather technical sense of the word "wealth." What people will give you money for. This is an interesting sort of wealth to study, because it is the kind that prevents you from starving. And what people will give you money for depends on them, not you.

当你创办一家企业时,很容易滑入认为客户想要你所做的事情的思维中。在互联网泡沫时期,我遇到过一个女人,因为她喜欢户外活动,所以她正在创办一个“户外门户网站”。你知道如果你喜欢户外活动,你应该创办什么样的企业吗?一个从崩溃的硬盘中恢复数据的企业。

When you're starting a business, it's easy to slide into thinking that customers want what you do. During the Internet Bubble I talked to a woman who, because she liked the outdoors, was starting an "outdoor portal." You know what kind of business you should start if you like the outdoors? One to recover data from crashed hard disks.

有什么联系吗?完全没有。这正是我的观点。如果你想创造财富(在不挨饿的狭义技术意义上),那么你应该对任何以你喜欢做的事情为中心的计划持怀疑态度。那是你对什么是有价值的想法最不可能与他人一致的地方。

What's the connection? None at all. Which is precisely my point. If you want to create wealth (in the narrow technical sense of not starving) then you should be especially skeptical about any plan that centers on things you like doing. That is where your idea of what's valuable is least likely to coincide with other people's.

[5] 在普通汽车修复中,你确实可能通过对环境造成微小的破坏,从而让其他人都变得微不足道地更穷。虽然应该考虑到环境成本,但这并不会使财富成为零和博弈。例如,如果你修理一台因零件松动而损坏的机器,你就创造了财富,而没有环境成本。

[5] In the average car restoration you probably do make everyone else microscopically poorer, by doing a small amount of damage to the environment. While environmental costs should be taken into account, they don't make wealth a zero-sum game. For example, if you repair a machine that's broken because a part has come unscrewed, you create wealth with no environmental cost.

[5b] 这篇文章是在 Firefox 出现之前写的。

[5b] This essay was written before Firefox.

[6] 许多人在二十多岁出头时感到困惑和沮丧。大学生活似乎有趣得多。好吧,当然如此。不要被表面上的相似性所愚弄。你已经从客人变成了仆人。在这个新世界里也可以找到乐趣。除其他外,你现在可以进入写着“非授权人员禁止入内”的门后。但这种改变起初是一种冲击,如果你没有意识到这一点,情况会更糟。

[6] Many people feel confused and depressed in their early twenties. Life seemed so much more fun in college. Well, of course it was. Don't be fooled by the surface similarities. You've gone from guest to servant. It's possible to have fun in this new world. Among other things, you now get to go behind the doors that say "authorized personnel only." But the change is a shock at first, and all the worse if you're not consciously aware of it.

[7] 当风险投资人问我们另一家创业公司需要多长时间才能复制我们的软件时,我们常常回答说他们可能根本无法复制。我认为这让我们看起来很幼稚,或者是骗子。

[7] When VCs asked us how long it would take another startup to duplicate our software, we used to reply that they probably wouldn't be able to at all. I think this made us seem naive, or liars.

[8] 很少有技术是由一个明确的发明者创造的。因此,作为一项规则,如果你知道某样东西(电话、装配线、飞机、灯泡、晶体管)的“发明者”,那是因为他们的公司从中赚了钱,而该公司的公关人员努力传播了这个故事。如果你不知道是谁发明了某样东西(汽车、电视、计算机、喷气发动机、激光器),那是因为其他公司赚走了所有的钱。

[8] Few technologies have one clear inventor. So as a rule, if you know the "inventor" of something (the telephone, the assembly line, the airplane, the light bulb, the transistor) it is because their company made money from it, and the company's PR people worked hard to spread the story. If you don't know who invented something (the automobile, the television, the computer, the jet engine, the laser), it's because other companies made all the money.

[9] 这是对整个人生都有用的好计划。如果你有两个选择,选择较难的那个。如果你在纠结是出去跑步还是坐在家里看电视,去跑步吧。这个诀窍之所以如此有效,大概是因为当你面临两个选择而其中一个较难时,你考虑另一个选择的唯一原因就是懒惰。你内心深处知道正确的事情是什么,而这个诀窍只是强迫你承认它。

[9] This is a good plan for life in general. If you have two choices, choose the harder. If you're trying to decide whether to go out running or sit home and watch TV, go running. Probably the reason this trick works so well is that when you have two choices and one is harder, the only reason you're even considering the other is laziness. You know in the back of your mind what's the right thing to do, and this trick merely forces you to acknowledge it.

[10] 中产阶级最早出现在意大利北部和低地国家,这可能并非偶然,因为那里没有强大的中央政府。这两个地区是当时最富有的地区,并成为文艺复兴文明辐射的双中心。如果他们不再扮演那个角色,那是因为其他地方(如美国)更忠实于他们发现的原则。

[10] It is probably no accident that the middle class first appeared in northern Italy and the low countries, where there were no strong central governments. These two regions were the richest of their time and became the twin centers from which Renaissance civilization radiated. If they no longer play that role, it is because other places, like the United States, have been truer to the principles they discovered.

[11] 这确实可能是一个充分条件。但如果是这样,为什么工业革命没有更早发生?两个可能的(且不矛盾的)答案:(a)它确实发生了。工业革命是一系列革命中的一个。(b)因为在中世纪城镇中,垄断和行会规定起初减缓了新生产资料的发展。

[11] It may indeed be a sufficient condition. But if so, why didn't the Industrial Revolution happen earlier? Two possible (and not incompatible) answers: (a) It did. The Industrial Revolution was one in a series. (b) Because in medieval towns, monopolies and guild regulations initially slowed the development of new means of production.

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